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“Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan was the seed of calamity. Wherever he went across the globe, you wanted to be sniffing round.” So started Dr. Amnon Sofrin, the top of the Mossad’s intelligence division within the mid-2000s, as he retold the story of Israel’s discovery that Syria had secretly constructed a nuclear reactor and was near bringing it on-line.
Some 15 years after the destruction of the reactor in Deir Ezzor, Sofrin revealed in an interview with Zman Israel, the Occasions of Israel’s sister website, how Israel got here to hold out the strike, in addition to how shut it got here to committing one in all its largest intelligence blunders.
Sofrin, who started his profession in Army Intelligence after which after his discharge joined the Mossad spy company, described, step-by-step, the tortuous developments forward of a decisive dialog he had with then-prime minister Ehud Olmert, throughout which the Israeli premier was knowledgeable that inside just a few weeks Syria was set to develop into a nuclear-capable nation.
First warning signal: The Libyan shock
“In December 2003, the British and Individuals introduced that after a number of months of negotiations, they managed to persuade [Libyan leader Muammar] Gaddafi to surrender his plans for nuclear weapons — in change for lifting sanctions,” Sofrin stated.
“I have a look at this incident and ask myself: Did we find out about it? I understood that there was some form of infrastructure in Libya, however we have been very removed from understanding the scenario and the way shut Gaddafi was to a nuclear [weapon]. All of us understood that Israel was excluded from the method and this required us to attract speedy conclusions,” he stated.
Display screen seize from video of Amnon Sofrin, former head of the Mossad’s intelligence division. (YouTube. Utilized in accordance with Clause 27a of the Copyright Regulation
It turned out that the Libyan nuclear undertaking was at a really superior stage. The particular person behind the undertaking was Khan, a Pakistani physicist who offered his nuclear know-how to anybody who wished it. Not less than two nations have been identified to have purchased Khan’s providers — Iran and Libya.
Behind the concealment of the Libyan undertaking was the Swiss Tinner household, which equipped the development supplies to centrifuge enrichment websites utilizing solid payments of lading introduced to Swiss authorities.
The 2 important nuclear websites in Libya have been hidden in a college and a rural farm. In some unspecified time in the future, details about the Tinner household’s involvement reached the CIA, making them, successfully, double brokers offering data on the progress of the Libyan nuclear undertaking overseen by Khan.
This was the intelligence upon which the US and Britain relied after they approached Gaddafi and threatened to assault the amenities. Gaddafi did a fast calculation and realized that his destiny could be the identical as Saddam Hussein’s in Iraq, and he agreed to disclose the whole undertaking and permit UN inspectors to dismantle it.
Israel, which was excluded in any respect levels — from the intelligence to the key negotiations — was shocked.
On this Feb. 26, 2013, file photograph, Pakistan’s nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan waves to supporters in Islamabad, Pakistan (BK Bangash/AP)
The touring scientist and a suspicious path
“With the American announcement, we realized that the Pakistanis have been closely concerned in Libya,” Sofrin stated. “We began researching and the identify of Dr. Khan instantly got here up, the daddy of Pakistan’s first Muslim bomb.
Three nations soar out at me: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. I instantly dismiss the primary two, due to their dependence on and worry of the US
“We understood that he got here to Libya along with his folks for a turnkey undertaking. He distributed centrifuges and amenities all through Libya. I seemed on the information and stated to myself, ‘Wait, wait. If Dr. Khan is the undertaking supervisor, let’s see the place else he has been within the Center East.’
“After a really fast test, three nations soar out at me: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. I instantly dismiss the primary two, due to their dependence on and worry of the US. I assessed on the time that they might not make such a blatant and defiant transfer in opposition to the US,” Sofrin stated.
Illustrative. Centrifuges enriching uranium. (Public Area/US Division of Power/Wikimedia Commons)
Within the early 2000s sure data had reached Israel from a 3rd get together about Syrian actions associated to nuclear centrifuges. The knowledge was uncooked and preliminary and didn’t develop to the purpose of being sufficient to launch an intelligence operation.
This was till the American-British announcement concerning the dismantling of Gaddafi’s undertaking.
“Relating to Syria, I instantly had a priority,” Sofrin stated, “It cohered with the uncooked data circulating within the system. I advised my folks, ‘Let’s see what’s occurring. Is there one thing right here that we didn’t acknowledge earlier than as a suspicious signal?’ I took two of my researchers — veteran and skilled — and requested them to take all the fabric from the final decade and analyze Syria’s intentions within the context of the Libyan case.
“My concept was to concentrate on the connection with the Pakistanis and whether or not there may be something within the intelligence that would level to a nuclear undertaking. After a month and a half of labor, they arrive again to me with a transparent conclusion that Syria has a nuclear program. Relating to the main points, they might not clarify precisely what, how, or why, however the conclusion was decisive: There may be exercise meaning [the Syrians are] constructing nuclear capabilities, and that is already taking place in January 2004.”
At that stage, so far as the Mossad was involved, there was already a suspicious convergence of circumstances, though the conclusions weren’t unequivocal.
“There have been too many query marks on this puzzle,” recalled Sofrin.
The IDF’s Army Intelligence Directorate continued to research the matter, however the bulk of the gathering and evaluation was accomplished by the Mossad.
In February 2004, the Mossad issued a primary warning about the potential for a nuclear undertaking in Syria
“I requested to see the 150 key items of intelligence on which my Mossad researchers based mostly their conclusion. I wished to learn them alone, quietly, to see if I got here to a special conclusion. On the identical time, I constructed a ‘pink crew’ that might attempt to problem the ultimate conclusion concerning the Syrian nuclear undertaking.
“I emphasised that the pink crew wouldn’t know the conclusion of the 2 researchers. On this case, we acted in relative separation in order to be as exact as attainable in our dedication. All of us got here to the identical conclusion, that there’s something there that can’t be defined or outlined at this stage, however one thing is occurring,” he stated.
Former Mossad chief Meir Dagan (Kobi Gideon/Flash90, File)
In February 2004, the Mossad issued a primary warning about the potential for a nuclear undertaking in Syria. In line with Sofrin, the Mossad doc “clearly pointed” to suspicious exercise based mostly on the Libyan expertise and the involvement of the Pakistani scientist.
Nonetheless, the main focus was nonetheless on the seek for enrichment websites and provide routes, and traces of centrifuge components. Khan specialised on this methodology of enrichment and the working assumption was that Syria was following the identical path, an evaluation that later proved to be flawed.
Instantly after the conclusions of the Army Intelligence groups, Sofrin up to date the top of the Mossad. “I went as much as Meir Dagan with this and laid out the entire image in entrance of him. He and Tamir Pardo, who was his deputy, determined to arrange a plan of actions to disclose what was taking place there,” he stated.
“It was a really orderly work plan by the Mossad, with many operations alongside the best way. What occurred intelligence-wise afterward was much like opening home windows — every time one other window opened for us with a brand new tip. On the finish of 2006, we started to type up across the understanding that there are a number of locations with suspicious exercise. At this level, we couldn’t outline what’s in every place, however we assessed that there was nuclear exercise,” he stated.
Syrian President Bashar Assad in Damascus, Syria, 2019. (SANA FILE through AP, File)
At that stage, each Army Intelligence and the Mossad have been deep in a worldwide intelligence operation to know Syrian President Bashar Assad’s intentions. Conferences of the 2 organizations to debate the scenario had multiplied and develop into increasingly more frequent.
The incoming head of the Nationwide Safety Company on the time, Main Common Amos Yadlin, advised a convention of the Institute for Nationwide Safety Research that his first dialog in his new position was with the top of the analysis division, Brigadier Common Itai Baron.
“I advised him that a very powerful factor for me was to find the nuclear reactor that Israel doesn’t find out about,” he advised the convention.
The assertion by Yadlin raised eyebrows within the safety institution in mild of the superior stage at which the Mossad was and the unequivocal warning issued in January 2004.
Work on development for the muse of a reactor underway at Kumho on North Korea’s northeastern coast, August 7, 2002. (Ahn Younger-joon/AP)
“Slowly, slowly we have been growing our exercise and finishing increasingly more items in an enormous puzzle, however we nonetheless didn’t have the smoking gun,” stated Sofrin.
A turning level got here throughout one of many periodic discussions on the matter with Army Intelligence, he stated.
“A younger main advised me: ‘Possibly we’re going astray’ in the important thing assumption “we had concerning centrifuges and the fitting route is definitely a plutonium reactor.’”
Enrichment in a plutonium reactor is completed by fissioning metallic rods inserted into the reactor core. For this function, the development of a reactor with a lead and concrete cowl round it’s required to forestall leakage. Additionally, in contrast to uranium enrichment centrifuges that may be deployed at any location, a plutogenic reactor is normally constructed close to a water supply to permit its steady cooling.
One other widespread step to the bomb is thru using centrifuges that enrich uranium to the extent of 90 p.c, from which the nuclear explosive materials is extracted. The naturally mined uranium is changed into a gasoline, put into centrifuges and enriched by spinning them. After it’s enriched to 90%, the uranium is changed into a metallic substance — the guts of the bomb.
Taking a brand new strategy
“This remark by a Army Intelligence consultant in 2006 led us to rethink the context of intelligence protection. We requested, ‘What ought to we search for?’ As a result of if it was a plutogenic reactor — it didn’t correspond to Pakistani information, however relatively to the information of North Korea,” Sofrin stated.
“Then, shortly afterward, we found growing exercise of North Koreans in Syria. We grew to become conscious of this exercise as a part of Pyongyang’s help in organising manufacturing strains for Syria’s Scud D missiles. Then we realized that there have been extra Koreans.”
A touch on the form of intelligence that Israel could have exploited got here in an interview given by Brigadier Common (reserve) Eli Ben-Meir, who in 2006 was head of the technical division within the Army Intelligence Directorate. He was as soon as requested in an interview with Radio 103FM if stories of an elevated variety of Koreans arriving at Syrian hospitals with abdomen issues contributed to setting off warning lights of a attainable plutonium reactor. Ben-Meir didn’t deny the suggestion.
The Mossad was placing collectively extra items that strengthened the evaluation that what they have been searching for was almost definitely a plutogenic reactor. However the smoking gun was nonetheless lacking. It was clear to everybody that it was a race in opposition to time — till March 2007 and an alleged Mossad coup in Vienna.
Syrian attaché Ibrahim Othman, left, talks to the top of Iran’s Atomic Power Group, Ali Akbar Salehi, previous to the beginning of the overall convention of the Worldwide Atomic Power Company, in Vienna, Austria, September 16, 2013. (Hans Punz/AP)
In line with an investigation by The New Yorker — which was by no means denied by Israel — Mossad brokers adopted Ibrahim Othman, the top of Syria’s Atomic Power Company, who arrived to attend the annual assembly of governors on the UN Atomic Power Company headquarters in Vienna. In line with the investigation, Mossad employees broke into his resort room, cloned his PC, and left with no hint.
We noticed many suspicious indicators: it was an remoted space, close to the Euphrates River; the development of a pipeline with a pumping station. Taking a look at all these parts, you understood that one thing was brewing there, however we nonetheless lacked the gold-standard proof
“Truly, at this level we have been already fairly certain,” Sofrin revealed. “After realizing that the exercise was plutogenic and never centrifugal, we started to mark suspicious areas for the development of a reactor. We situated the construction in Deir Ezzor as one in all them, however we didn’t know what was inside it.”
“We noticed many suspicious indicators: it was an remoted space, close to the Euphrates River; the development of a pipeline with a pumping station. Taking a look at all these parts, you understood that one thing was brewing there, however we nonetheless lacked the gold-standard proof.”
The decoding of Othman’s laptop computer by Army Intelligence arrived on the unconventional weapons division of the Mossad on a Wednesday evening. The Mossad’s specialists analyzed the fabric for hours and have been amazed — the pictures left no room for doubt. The plutogenic reactor was prepared for operation, together with a core, cooling techniques and water inlet and outlet pipes.
In line with the Intelli Occasions web site, one other photograph was discovered — the top of Syria’s nuclear company in Damascus along with his counterpart from North Korea.
“Early within the morning I acquired a name from the Mossad headquarters and my analysis employees have been on the road,” Sofrin stated. “They merely advised me: ‘Come, as a result of there are attention-grabbing issues.’
“I arrived instantly, and after a brief overview we understood the implications: We needed to instantly inform superiors and the political echelon,” he stated.
“Each Thursday, Meir Dagan had a daily replace assembly with the prime minister in Jerusalem. I caught him on the best way there and advised him, ‘We have now a sizzling potato in our hand.’ Dagan replied, ‘Get right here fast.’”
Then-prime minister Ehud Olmert pauses previous to a gathering of the International Affairs and Protection committee on the Knesset in Jerusalem, October 30, 2006. (Pierre Terdjman / Flash90)
At this level, Sofrin described one of the dramatic moments in Israel’s safety historical past: the second by which a main minister acquired information of an existential menace to the nation.
“Olmert sat, listened with nice focus and remained silent. After just a few seconds he leaned again, exhaled and requested: ‘What will we do with this?’”
“I entered the room the place Ehud Olmert and Dagan have been sitting, and I stated to the prime minister: ‘Do you keep in mind our briefing on the Syrian nuclear problem? Effectively, Mr. Prime Minister, the query marks are eliminated, there are solely exclamation marks.’
“Olmert sat, listened with nice focus and remained silent. After just a few seconds he leaned again, exhaled and requested: ‘What will we do with this?’”
“Dagan and I answered routinely: ‘Take it down.’ From right here every part began to unfold: the institution of a particular cupboard with knowledgeable groups and meticulous monitoring of the Air Power’s preparations.”
The race in opposition to time
At that time, Israel entered a race in opposition to time for worry that the plutonium cargo was already in Syria and the reactor could be switched on, Sofrin stated. If that have been the case, any assault on it might imply an uncontrolled nuclear explosion. Olmert appealed to the Individuals, asking that they assault the location.
“George W. Bush refused and Olmert ended the dialog with the sentence, ‘Israel will do what it has to do.’”
Past the intelligence and operational effort, Israel’s strict working assumption was that following the reactor bombing Assad would begin a conflict with Israel. Within the preparatory talks with Bush, Israel requested for distinctive weapons in giant portions. The administration instantly assented and requested: “By aircraft or by ship?”
Then-prime minister Ehud Olmert, proper, stands with then-US president George W Bush throughout a welcoming ceremony at Ben Gurion Worldwide Airport in Tel Aviv on Could 14, 2008. (Nati Shohat/Flash90)
In Israel there was concern that air trains would reveal Israel’s intentions as a result of Syria had already begun to point out indicators of suspicion. The choice was made to convey the armaments by sea, however when the American ship arrived, it turned out that it was too large to dock in Ashdod port.
The one appropriate port was on the island of Crete. The ship was diverted there and for 3 days Israeli ships loaded the cargo in Crete and transported it to Israel with out anybody noticing the extraordinary Israeli exercise within the Mediterranean Sea.
In what was dubbed Operation Outdoors the Field, the IDF on September 6, 2007, bombed the Syrian reactor, demolishing the location.
Strategic steadiness: A pink mild, a mistake
Looking back, it grew to become clear to Israel that as within the case of the Libyan nuclear undertaking, every part had been accomplished underneath the radar, out of sight of Israeli or American intelligence. North Korea, underneath the guise of assist to the missile business, managed to trick the West as soon as once more. The Syrian reactor was a precise copy of the nuclear reactor in North Korea.
Syrian girls stroll previous a big portrait of President Bashar al-Assad and a watermarked portrait of his late father and former President Hafez al-Assad as they queue to attend the government-sponsored “Ghouta Procuring Competition”, within the Jap Ghouta city of Douma, on the japanese outskirts of the capital Damascus, on Could 13, 2018.(AFP PHOTO / LOUAI BESHARA)
Lastly, Sofrin supplied a really attention-grabbing perception. The undertaking didn’t start with Bashar Assad however along with his father, Hafez, most likely already within the mid-Eighties.
Assad the elder usually talked about the phrase “strategic steadiness” throughout this era. In Israel that was taken to imply one factor, however Assad meant one thing else.
“When Hafez Assad stated ‘strategic steadiness’ we thought he was speaking a couple of important strengthening of his standard navy capability to face Israel alone,” Sofrin stated.
“Assad Jr. put out one thing comparable and we thought he was echoing his father. Solely in hindsight did we notice that he meant going nuclear. The considering and planning have been the daddy’s, for certain.”
The unique Hebrew model of this text seems on The Occasions of Israel’s sister website, Zman Yisrael, right here.
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