The UAE is making a precarious shift in its Libya policy. Here’s why.

Libya’s internationalized civil battle of 2019 paved the best way for the rise in prominence of Turkey and Russia in Libya. After initially intervening to again the nation’s warring factions, Moscow and Ankara de-escalated and have since centered on entrenchment, making an attempt to carve up Libya into separate spheres of affect. But, an underemphasized cog within the wheel of precarious peace—which has prevailed in Libya because the finish of the 2019-2020 battle—is a shift within the United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) coverage. Whereas this reconfiguration is partly attributable to the Center East’s “nice reset,” Abu Dhabi’s “zero-problem” coverage with neighbors and its thaw in relations with regional rivals, Libya-specific dynamics have additionally performed a central position in shifting the Emirates’ calculus.

The UAE’s interventionism in Libya goes again to 2011. The UAE considered Libya as a central battleground for the order of post-revolutionary states after the 2011 Arab uprisings, with the goal of curbing the position of Islamist events, just like the Muslim Brotherhood, in governance. This coverage crystallized as unique political and navy assist for Basic Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) in 2014. To assist Haftar’s battle effort to counter Islamists and political opponents in Jap Libya, the UAE balanced between unilateral interventionism and funneling assist utilizing Egypt as a proxy, leveraging the Egypt-Libya land border. It additionally used its delicate energy within the Elysée, supporting France’s impulse to supply navy and diplomatic assist for the Libyan common. These efforts boosted Haftar’s worldwide standing whereas serving to him safe management over Jap after which Southern Libya, in addition to Libya’s oil crescent, primarily utilizing UAE-supplied tools and aerial assist.

Emirati navy assist for Haftar peaked in 2019-2020, attracting unfavourable consideration that added to the reputational toll of its involvement within the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. Throughout Haftar’s offensive, the UAE performed a whole lot of drone strikes on Haftar’s behalf, provided him with weaponry and jet gasoline, and financed Sudanese mercenaries that fought together with his LAAF. Regardless of this, Haftar’s battle effort confronted setbacks, prompting Abu Dhabi to re-adjust its international coverage to pre-empt elevated scrutiny over its navy adventurism.

As a substitute of ramping up direct interventionism to assist Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli, Abu Dhabi turned the conduit for Russian paramilitary forces’ on-the-ground engagement in Tripoli’s suburbs. In response to the US Division of Protection, the UAE allegedly underwrote elements of Moscow’s intervention in Libya by doubtlessly funneling funds to the Wagner Group, a sanctioned Russian mercenary group. These intervened at a essential second for Haftar and offset his diminished skill to mobilize floor troops for his offensive.

The reshuffle of Libya’s government after a United Nations-sponsored political dialogue in 2021 was one other second of adjustment for the UAE’s coverage. Coincidentally, the arrival of the Authorities of Nationwide Unity (GNU) rapidly adopted Abu Dhabi’s formalization of the Abraham Accords and its elevated concentrate on regional neighbors, comparable to Israel. In apply, GNU Prime Minister Abdelhamid Dbaiba’s emergence in Libya’s political scene dovetailed with Abu Dhabi more and more exporting a imaginative and prescient of international coverage that centered round pragmatism, financial stability, and commerce partnerships in gentle of the accords. Whereas the UAE didn’t change the essence of its international coverage, its rhetoric contrasted sharply with the previous, extra muscular strategy to international coverage Abu Dhabi employed.

Although initially uneasy with Dbaiba as a result of his ties in Libya’s Islamist milieu, the prime minister—who can also be not a champion of liberal democracy—ultimately secured Abu Dhabi’s acquiescence as a result of his transactional approaches aligning with Abu Dhabi’s international coverage shift. Including to Emirati reduction was the truth that Dbaiba didn’t preferentially empower Islamist actors inside his government. This led to a burgeoning relationship between Abu Dhabi and Tripoli, with Dbaiba in search of to revive Muammar Gaddafi-era offers with the Emirates within the telecommunications, vitality, and building sectors, in addition to covertly negotiating Emirati corporations’ entry to function free-trade-zones, financial zones, and ports. Conversely, Abu Dhabi’s most notable concession vis-à-vis the GNU has been its quiet cutting down of economic assist to pro-Haftar partisan media shops and TV channels it was suspected of funding, forcing some to close down.

These developments have been additionally influenced by the actual fact the UAE was partaking in a fast-paced rapprochement with Turkey that led to boosted financial ties with Ankara. The implications of the US’ chaotic pull-out from Afghanistan in 2021 had led the Emirates to prioritize increasing alliances in an effort to keep away from dependence on the US. This led it to concentrate on regional diplomacy, bringing Abu Dhabi nearer to Ankara. In Libya, it was, in flip, extra pragmatic for the UAE to not compromise its rapprochement with Turkey by doubling down on Haftar or undermining a Turkish-backed Dbaiba.

As a substitute, the UAE centered on brokering conciliative conferences and shuttle diplomacy between Dbaiba and Haftar’s circles, making an attempt to fabricate power-sharing preparations between each. The substitute of Sanalla as Nationwide Oil Company (NOC) Chairman—executed by Dbaiba and adopted by Haftar lifting his then-blockade on oil ports—is maybe one of the notable impacts of this mediation up to now. But, new NOC Chairman Bengdara’s private affinity with Abu Dhabi additionally demonstrates that a part of this Emirati mediation effort is rooted in self-interest and broader OPEC-related politicking.

In selecting to not compromise its rapprochement with Turkey and supporting Dbaiba, the UAE has damaged with its long-standing standing companions in Libya: Egypt and France. Since March of this 12 months, the latter have centered on overtly undermining the GNU, as an alternative, backing the bid of former Libyan Inside Minister Fathi Bashagha for the publish of Prime Minister. The UAE has conspicuously not partaken on this effort.

Whereas aforementioned dynamics performed an element in shaping the Emirates’ new coverage of equidistance between Haftar and Dbaiba, different underemphasized elements performed an element within the Emirates’ apathy in the direction of Bashagha. For one, his bid forces a relapse right into a battle that will see the UAE compromise its present financial ties with Tripoli. Furthermore, ought to Abu Dhabi partake in one other bout of Libyan battle, the Emirates would incur undesirable reputational injury and be pressured to compromise its relations with both Turkey, the US, and/or Russia relying on the place it takes.

One other concern is that Bashagha’s bid for prime minister is backed by outstanding figures of Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood with hyperlinks to Qatar, the UAE’s regional rival. Lastly, it is usually suspected that Abu Dhabi has a private animosity in the direction of Bashagha, who performed a outstanding position in countering the Emirati-backed offensive of Haftar on Tripoli in 2019. Some speculate that Emirati officers maintain Bashagha accountable for the alleged demise of six Emirati troopers, who have been covertly deployed to the Libyan airbase of Jufra, by a drone strike in late 2019.

All in all, the extent to which the UAE’s coverage shift in the direction of Libya has been a part of a regional recalibration on its half shouldn’t be overemphasized. As an influential actor within the Libyan panorama for over a decade, it comes as no shock that modifications in Emirati coverage have had a direct influence on ranges of (in)stability in Libya, with Emiratis’ shift in place now positively influencing a protracted lull. However the UAE’s shift has additionally been affected by developments within the Libyan context, a theater whose solely fixed is its volatility. Whereas Libya’s relative peace has endured since its internationalized civil battle led to 2020, policymakers mustn’t relaxation in complacency pondering this new regional order is the brand new regular. The home of playing cards of ostrich insurance policies, short-term outlooks, and transactionalism upon which the Center East’s nice reset is constructed could endure some time. Nonetheless, the geopolitical calculus preserving peace in Libya could properly collapse to the nation’s exceptionalism lengthy earlier than that.

Emadeddin Badi is a senior non-resident fellow on the Atlantic Council’s Center East Program. Observe him on Twitter @emad_badi.

Additional studying

Tue, Jun 1, 2021

Egypt recalibrated its technique in Libya due to Turkey

MENASource
By
Alessia Melcangi

It’s evident that the strategic pivots of Egyptian management in Libya are adapting and evolving in concordance with developments on the bottom and maintaining in thoughts wider regional implications—notably its relations with Turkey.

Picture: Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan meets with Libyan Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibeh in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates April 7, 2021. Image taken April 7, 2021. WAM/Handout through REUTERS.