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Tehran is conscious that the Nakhchivan hall agreed underneath the 2020 Russia-brokered ceasefire would join mainland Azerbaijan not solely with its exclave but in addition with its ally, Turkey, Iran’s regional rival, writes Nikola Mikovic.
Nikola Mikovic is a political analyst in Serbia. His work focuses totally on the overseas insurance policies of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with particular consideration on vitality and “pipeline politics.”
Final month, as protests unfold throughout Iran, the navy’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was centered on one other, much less apparent menace to the regime: a potential peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
As a part of large-scale navy workout routines, the IRGC practised, reportedly for the primary time, utilizing non permanent bridges to cross the Aras River, which separates Iran from Azerbaijan and Armenia. The present of navy power, formally routine drills, was a symbolic message to Baku that Tehran received’t settle for modifications on this border area.
However why is Iran so involved {that a} potential peace settlement between the 2 archenemies would possibly result in such an final result? And the way may tweaks on a map problem Iranian energy?
As a part of the 2020 Russian-brokered ceasefire that successfully ended the 44-day battle between the 2 international locations, which was fought over the Nagorno-Karabakh area, Armenia agreed to the development of a transport hyperlink between western Azerbaijan and its Nakhchivan exclave, which is surrounded by Armenian and Iranian territory and shares a small border with Turkey. The deal was meant to make sure unimpeded residents, automobiles, and items motion between the Azerbaijani areas.
Management over transport hyperlinks for this hall can be assured by the Federal Safety Service (FSB) of Russia, which is one cause why the transit hyperlink stays a degree of competition. Armenia fears that the Nakhchivan hall may affect its sovereignty and, in flip, have an effect on its border with Iran.
Azerbaijan, because the clear winner of the 44-day battle, is pushing for the implementation of the Moscow deal and desires Armenia to construct street and rail hyperlinks alongside its border with Iran, with no passport or customs controls.
Tehran, for its half, is conscious that the Nakhchivan hall would join mainland Azerbaijan not solely with its exclave but in addition with its ally, Turkey, Iran’s regional rival.
Certainly, if the Nakhchivan hall is constructed, it’s going to give Turkey a brand new land path to the South Caucasus, which the Turkish management would possible use to strengthen its presence within the energy-rich area. Turkey would even acquire a sooner path to Central Asian markets, a large geopolitical victory for Ankara, giving it a transportation springboard to implement a few of its formidable pan-Turkic objectives.
All of those developments may weaken Iran’s place within the area. The hyperlink would finish Azerbaijan’s dependence on Iran for transit and remove the Islamic Republic’s monopoly on transit providers within the South Caucasus. The transport hall would additionally hand management over the distribution of water sources within the Aras River basin to Baku.
Safety is the ultimate cause why Iranian authorities concern the Nakhchivan hyperlink: If constructed as proposed, it could possibly be utilized by Iran’s foes for navy functions.
Azerbaijan, regardless of being majority Shia, has robust navy ties with Israel, Iran’s archenemy. It’s an open secret that the Israeli navy would look to make use of Azerbaijan’s territory within the occasion of a serious battle with Iran. The very last thing Tehran needs is to see an Azerbaijan-Armenia peace deal pave the way in which for Israel’s expanded presence.
Taken collectively, the Islamic Republic appears intent on stopping the development of the transit hall by Armenian territory.
Following Tehran’s navy workout routines within the Aras, International Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian opened the Islamic Republic’s consulate normal in Kapan, in southern Armenia’s Syunik province, a strategically vital space by which the Nakhchivan hall would move. It was one other sign to Azerbaijan that Iran sees itself as an unavoidable actor within the South Caucasus. Iran can also be contemplating promoting weapons, notably Shahed-136 drones, to Armenia.
Tehran isn’t coy with its intentions. In a video aired on state tv a few days after its navy workout routines, the Azeri-language broadcaster, Sahar TV, warned Azerbaijan that “anybody who seems to be at Iran the mistaken means have to be destroyed.” Whereas Iranian officers later sought to downplay the rhetoric, emphasising “pleasant and brotherly relations” between the 2 international locations, it’s laborious to not view latest occasions as an escalation.
Azerbaijan has been equally combative; latest articles printed in media near the federal government supported the secession of Iranian provinces the place ethnic Azerbaijani comprise many of the inhabitants. Given this improvement, it’s conceivable that the IRGC’s navy workout routines close to the Azerbaijani border – which have been held amid protests in Azeri-dominated components of Iran – have been really meant for a home viewers.
One factor is certain: Present relations between Azerbaijan and Iran are neither pleasant nor brotherly. Whereas Azerbaijan is a secular nation, the Shia religion appears to be the one factor that the 2 international locations share. Baku and Tehran produce other allies, priorities, and geopolitical objectives.
Thus, if Azerbaijan ultimately succeeds in constructing its part of the Russia-supported Nakhchivan hall, Iran would be the second largest loser of the 2020 battle.
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