Can China Continue to Balance Between Saudi Arabia and Iran?  – The Diplomat

Final week, China’s President Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia for a historic multi-day go to to attend three main regional occasions: the Saudi-China summit, the China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit, and the China-Arab Summit. Throughout the go to, Xi and Saudi King Salman hailed a brand new period in Sino-Saudi bilateral relations.

The grandeur of Xi’s go to despatched highly effective indicators that Sino-Saudi ties are getting into a brand new interval of speedy growth. For China’s different Gulf associate, Iran, the strengthening of ties may imply a definite drawback for Tehran in its protracted rivalry with Saudi Arabia.

China’s relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran are sophisticated. China’s management has to rigorously handle its relations with each to take care of its neutrality and defend its personal financial, political, and safety pursuits. Each few years, Beijing goes on a diplomatic offensive within the Gulf, sparking hypothesis from observers that China is favoring one facet over the opposite within the Saudi-Iran dispute.

Though China maintains shut relations with each international locations, Saudi Arabia has emerged as certainly one of Beijing’s main strategic companions within the area in recent times. Xi’s December go to to Riyadh is once more producing hypothesis that Beijing’s actions may offset a cautious diplomatic balancing act Chinese language officers have maintained with either side.

Beijing has labored tirelessly to remain out of the fray of the Gulf rivalry. The problem, nonetheless, is that any benefit supplied to 1 facet – for example, rumors of a $4 billion Saudi buy of Chinese language protection gear – might be perceived by the opposite as a drawback. To keep away from the notion of privileging Tehran or Riyadh, China has actively pursued a coverage of equivalency in its diplomatic engagements and army cooperation.

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As an illustration, in 2016, Xi signed complete strategic partnership agreements with each Saudi Arabia and Iran, inside weeks of one another. In each 2017 and 2019, Beijing held separate army drills with Iran and Saudi Arabia, spaced just a few weeks aside, to keep away from conveying the flawed message. And, as Xi concluded his Saudi Arabia journey on December 10, China’s ambassador to Tehran introduced Chinese language Vice Premier Hu Chunhua would go to Tehran the week of December 12.

Regardless of Beijing’s degree of care and a tacit tolerance for its relations with the opposite facet, each Iran and Saudi Arabia have expressed frustration with China over its dealings with the opposite. Following Xi’s journey to Saudi Arabia, Iran’s deputy overseas minister for the Asia-Pacific summoned China’s ambassador to Iran in a uncommon present of protest on December 12. Tehran wished to specific dissatisfaction over Beijing’s joint assertion with GCC nations, highlighting statements of assist to the GCC concerning disputed islands within the Straits of Hormuz that Iran discovered regarding. The China-GCC joint assertion additionally harassed the significance of the Iran nuclear problem, in addition to linking Iran to “destabilizing regional actions,” “assist for terrorist organizations,” in addition to the “proliferation of… drones.”

In the meantime, in 2021, Saudi officers expressed related concern over China’s 25-year settlement with Tehran. The formidable partnership set off pink flags in Saudi Arabia, prompting Saudi officers to aim to discourage Beijing from stronger ties with Iran.

Beijing’s balancing act, whereas not good, is strengthened by robust financial ties with each international locations and bilateral belief, which has been cultivated between China and each international locations over the previous decade. This belief has been key in permitting Beijing to climate the occasional diplomatic foible and course right when Tehran or Riyadh increase a criticism.

The query stays whether or not China’s extra aggressive GCC outreach this month is a brief swing of the pendulum from Iran towards Saudi Arabia or a brand new pro-Saudi established order. The previous is extra probably than the latter.

Saudi Arabia and the broader GCC could also be a near-term geopolitical precedence for Chinese language officers because of the speedy advantages of deepened ties with Saudi Arabia and Iran’s current home challenges. China more and more prefers predictable, steady, and high-return investments. Beijing’s financial ties, funding, and vitality ties with Riyadh have produced vital features with restricted dangers previously two years.

Iran, in the meantime, has not yielded such features for Chinese language traders within the quick time period. Chinese language companies in Iran stay slowed down with issues over the chance of triggering U.S. sanctions. In the meantime, a scarcity of progress in negotiations over a brand new nuclear take care of Iran has delayed any advantages of Beijing’s $400 billion settlement with Tehran. That is to be anticipated, given Beijing and Tehran’s strategic cooperation roadmap has a timeline of 25 years, in comparison with simply 5 years with Saudi Arabia. For China, its Iran partnership is a strategic ready recreation, one which requires in depth diplomatic consideration over the long run.

Beijing’s subsequent steps following Xi’s go to will probably purpose to reassure Iran of China’s neutrality and sign equivalency within the relationship. This technique will observe a well-known sample. First, China will deploy a senior-level official to Tehran to re-enforce its neutrality within the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry and emphasize China’s longstanding coverage of non-interference. Then, Beijing will have interaction in cautious diplomacy to speak with each international locations to forestall additional escalation with Iran whereas avoiding the impression of backstepping with the GCC. Whereas a vice premier is on the docket for an in-person Iran go to, the latest Iranian opposition to China’s joint assertion with the GCC could probably require higher-level Chinese language engagement, perhaps even a head of state name.

China will proceed to deepen relations with each Tehran and Riyadh whereas remaining above the fray within the protracted Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry. Nevertheless, its growing financial engagements with Saudi Arabia, the GCC, and the broader Arab world are placing stress on Iran. From Tehran’s viewpoint, the strengthening of Sino-Saudi ties supplies Saudi Arabia a internet benefit, whereas disadvantaging Iran’s pursuit of worldwide legitimacy. This has the potential to have an effect on China’s personal pursuits within the Gulf if it doesn’t restore its diplomatic steadiness.