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By David Scott Mathieson 20 June 2023
Myanmar has seen the again of the sixth Particular Envoy of the Secretary Basic of the United Nations since 1995. Noeleen Heyzer resigned her place in latest weeks, sooner than deliberate from her appointment in October 2021 and assuming her position in December of that 12 months.
What shall be her legacy? Not a lot. A sort evaluation may conclude she gave it the nice previous faculty strive, however was reasoning with caged beasts. A realpolitik regard would argue she was doomed from the beginning line, as a result of these caged beasts can’t be reasoned with.
What can we study from Heyzer’s 20 months within the place? There isn’t a lot to labor over. The navy State Administration Council (SAC) wasn’t thinking about any type of worldwide engagement not to mention mediation, and completely nothing to do with battle decision. The efforts of the Affiliation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been caught because the signing of the 5-Level Consensus in early 2021, but stay the lodestar of worldwide efforts no matter how adrift, capsized or sunk they’re. Heyzer didn’t have a lot to work with.
All the “good workplaces” place of the envoy is mired up to now, with its mandate within the UN Basic Meeting, not utterly with the Secretary Basic. There hasn’t been any severe reform of the position in near 30 years, some extent acknowledged by an in-depth examine of the nice workplaces mandate launched by the Worldwide Peace Academy (IPI) over 10 years in the past.
One of many concluding factors of that examine from 2012 may have been written at this time: “There is no such thing as a doubt that the UN carries a legacy of resentment or disappointment amongst many sides inside Myanmar who’ve felt, for various causes, that the nice workplaces up to now didn’t sufficiently contemplate their pursuits. Within the worldwide donor neighborhood, whereas some acknowledge the doubtless necessary position the UN can play in Myanmar, few appear to need the world group to truly take the lead in coordinating worldwide help to the nation.” The failure of the UN to achieve entry to Cyclone Mocha-affected communities in Rakhine State, or conflict-affected displaced in Sagaing Area, poses crucially necessary questions on the efficacy of the UN to stay in Myanmar.
With a weak and distracted Secretary Basic in António Guterres, a dysfunctional Everlasting 5 members of a divided Safety Council (China, Russia, america, Britain and France), it’s a surprise Heyzer received any consideration not to mention the extent of help she wanted from her first day.
Early on, she was roundly criticized for suggesting a type of “energy sharing” in a Channel Information Asia interview. Whether or not she misspoke or thought of it a severe proposal and was compelled to stroll it again following the furor, the harm of an unforced error was already inflicted. Her one journey to name on Min Aung Hlaing in August 2022 was an unmitigated catastrophe, with the SAC releasing particulars of their dialog that weren’t utterly congruent with what her post-visit assertion stated.
Following this envoy equal of road-kill, she was compelled to broaden her consultations to members of the resistance together with the Nationwide Unity Authorities (NUG) and a few ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), though this was an unusual growth. From the August go to till her resignation, she was dogged by criticism from all sides, a lot of it maybe unfair but reflecting frustration at ongoing violence and the entice of diplomatic language that compelled her to specific “deep concern” at incessant SAC mass atrocities.
Heyzer met with Chinese language overseas minister Qin Gang on Might 1, the place he “careworn the necessity to act prudently and pragmatically to stop the escalation of the battle and spillover of the disaster, and expressed his hope that Madame Particular Envoy will uphold an goal and truthful place and play a job as a bridge.” Journeys had been additionally made to India, and throughout Southeast Asia. Quickly after the announcement of her stepping down, she visited with NUG International Minister Daw Zin Mar Aung: a photograph of them hugging was each touching and, one hopes, cardiac arrest-inducing in Naypyitaw.
The World New Mild of Myanmar made its place on the UN clear in its June 16 opinion piece from Kyaw Myint Tun-Paris referred to as “The Image of Irrelevance.” It was classic vitriol. Whereas it might have been designed to sentence the UN system and worldwide mediation efforts, it should even be seen as a great riddance to Heyzer and a glove slap to any substitute.
“What breakthrough have they got to show in latest reminiscence? The place have they introduced lasting peace? Identify one! Underneath their watch document variety of individuals have been forcibly displaced or stateless. So, what have they completed? Is the world changing into extra peaceable? These individuals ought to be given no position to find options for the issues Myanmar is going through. Options for Myanmar will come from inside and with the assistance, cooperation and understanding of the neighbours (sic) and pleasant nations.” As if to pour salt on the wound, the paper additionally carried a report on a gathering with appearing UN Resident Coordinator Ramanathan Balakrishnan and colleagues with three SAC ministers in Sittwe, nonetheless struggling for official entry to help over a month after Cyclone Mocha.
What have we realized from the close to three a long time of particular envoys? Treasured little. The primary, the polished Peruvian diplomat Álvaro de Soto served from 1995 to 1999, which began optimistically with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s launch earlier than dissolving into repressive navy rule impasse. He could have visited the nation six occasions throughout his tenure, however he achieved little of notice other than the “concession” of assembly with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi on each go to.
De Soto’s contribution to Myanmar could also be slight, however his legacy as a UNSG particular envoy is instructive for Myanmar. Resigning from his envoy position within the Center East peace course of, his frustration at being hogtied to situations that restricted engagement with key actors was mirrored in his leaked Finish of Mission memo in Might 2007 following his resignation: “the UN ought to resist the pure temptation of just about each authorities and intergovernmental establishment to throw a committee or a czar, or on this case, an envoy, at an issue…(w)e will not be within the lead, and the position we play is subsidiary at greatest, harmful at worst.” An identical finish of mission memo from Heyzer ought to be inspired.
Then the reptilian Razali Ismael from Malaysia (2000-2005) served at a comparatively optimistic time following the discharge of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in 2002, however any optimism was dashed with the mass killing of her supporters at Depayin in Might 2003, after which the purge of his erstwhile associate, Navy Intelligence chief and Prime Minister Basic Khin Nyunt in October 2004. He refused to resume his place in early 2006 as a result of he had been not permitted to go to the nation in two years.
In a creepy two-step criticism of the then regime with pretension over his personal efficiency, Razali stated in an interview; “Progress has not been made in direction of any reconciliation. If there was any, that has now snapped with [Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s] continued home arrest… What chance is there of additional progress?… Nonetheless, there isn’t any frustration as this was, in spite of everything, a noble effort… good at dodging issues and stonewalling… Now we have been coping with these [Myanmar military] individuals for a really very long time now. We’re conversant in their methods.” This wasn’t precisely an commercial for institutional reminiscence and adaptive engagement.
Subsequent got here the previous Nigerian ambassador to the United Nations, Ibrahim Gambari. The then ruling State Peace and Growth Council (SPDC) ought to have acknowledged a kindred spirit in Gambari, in spite of everything he rebuffed the Basic Meeting after they condemned the execution of distinguished environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight different Ogani individuals in late 1995. Gambari confronted a real home political impasse in 2006, then the favored protests and the brutal crackdown of September 2007, Cyclone Nargis and the determined days of the UN looking for entry to affected areas and the well timed go to of Ban Ki-moon (who visited once more in April, with nice fanfare and no progress).
The Indian diplomat Vijay Nambiar loved higher success, however he operated between 2010 and 2016 when the opening afforded him entry, and even some EAOs welcomed his position within the peace course of. Nambiar wasn’t utterly astute: he requested Senior Basic Min Aung Hlaing to contribute Sit-Tat troops for UN peacekeeping operations in 2014 (a small quantity served in Liberia and South Sudan).
Christine Schraner Burgener was appointed in April 2018 following the carnage of ethnic cleaning in opposition to the Rohingya in Rakhine State, was advised by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to remain out of the peace course of and follow Rakhine, the place she may do little. Her post-2021 efficiency was strident in condemning the SAC, her calls with Vice Senior Basic Soe Win unresponsive, and her plaintive calls to go to Myanmar rebuffed by the SAC, but in addition over-stating her significance: “Clearly, I can think about that he [Min Aung Hlaing] wouldn’t wish to see me now in Myanmar as a result of the individuals know me… and they’d most likely be very inspired by my presence.” Regardless of pushing a a lot stiffer and decided UN response for an envoy, she was additionally criticized in Myanmar for perceived ethical equivalency in condemning violence by all sides (the entice of neutrality in vocalizing opposition to violence, even grossly uneven state violence and atrocity).
Kyaw Myint Tun-Paris summed up the previous envoys in colourful trend. “There have been appointments of those that had been now not needed anymore near the Ivory Tower in New York. Dump all of them on Myanmar! There was one who was appointed in order that frequent journeys may be made to see household and relations in a close-by nation [likely Gambari]. Then, there was a light-weight who had no clues in any respect about Myanmar [this could be any of them]. One promptly turned up at Davos quickly after the appointment… Whether or not there’s a want or not, they go to the nation regularly and put out press statements simply to indicate they’re working exhausting and justify their employment. Makes an attempt could be made to go to the nation particularly when their contract is up for extension.”
Like carrion birds, potential replacements are circling. However any future appointment will face not simply the identical mix of SAC stonewalling or UN dysfunction Heyzer endured, however a witches brew of aggressive engagement initiatives from predatory actors from China, India, Thailand and Japan by the Nippon Basis, together with the frozen efforts of ASEAN, and the rumors of makes an attempt from Switzerland, Norway, Finland and different deluded European states seeking to forge a breakthrough. The competing “Observe 1.5” efforts of Thailand has aggravated Indonesia, acquired no help from the remainder of ASEAN, and is however the newest knowledge level of dysfunction. Many of those efforts have some bit-part Myanmar gamers who’ve extremely questionable legitimacy and political cachet. All of this incoherence advantages the SAC, who chortle at foreigners competing for pole place to appease them.
For a lot of within the worldwide neighborhood have adopted a stance of mee-sa-ta-phet yay-mote-ta phet (holding the flame/torch in a single hand and the firehouse within the different): successfully hedging their bets on who’s going to “win” the battle and be the facet to ingratiate. There was a plethora of post-coup shapeshifting amongst overseas actors, who previous to February 2021 sought to have interaction the Myanmar deep state and its many conflict criminals, and who—no matter their affected ardor for the resistance now—will casually betray the revolution when the winds of opportunism shift.
If one other envoy goes to be offloaded on Myanmar, it can probably be one other seasoned diplomat with comparable abilities units to Heyzer. The candidates will resemble archetypes of worldwide servants, however to the SAC a bevy of min-laung (pretender kings, or extra precisely “imminent kings”) and their cohorts of pontificating min-sayar (king’s trainer, or advisor). There shall be no “innovation”, “off-ramping”, “nuance”, or that absolute pearl of statecraft considering, “recent method.” It’s nearly actually going to be some dirty model of what got here earlier than.
However does it must be? Is there a chance of clearly wanted reform? Ralph Waldo Emmerson wrote that “silly consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds, adored by little statesmen”, which may aptly describe the present cohort of Western diplomats and donors engaged on Myanmar all conjoined by a dearth of clear considering.
There are 4 potential programs of motion: in concept. In all probability the UN and P5 nations will shuffle on with an utter disregard for influence, progress or the pursuits of the individuals of Myanmar. However what if we entertain the potential for the self-straitjacketed world order to react in a different way, even with expectations on progress being as little as doable?
First, contemplate a utterly totally different candidate. Heyzer was deemed appropriate in late 2021 as a result of she was a consummate UN insider, who had sidled as much as the generals earlier than, and being Singaporean may “learn their minds” extra acutely. Many observers thought then as now, these qualities labored in opposition to her. The identical calculation holds true. In the event you discover merely a “new Noeleen” then we’ll all be concluding comparable bleak assessments of dashed expectations in three years as we’re at this time. Six very totally different envoys from Africa, Southeast Asia, Switzerland and Latin America have confounded calculations on whether or not outsiders or Asians are best. Nobody who really desires the job ought to be thought of, particularly if it’s former US ambassador to the UN Invoice Richardson or disgraced British politician Boris Johnson, ought to they put their fingers up. A UN lifer clearly has little comparative benefit apart from a extra acute understanding of the UN’s inner defects, as Heyzer demonstrated (as did earlier envoys). Former navy officers elicit little respect both, as retired US basic Wesley Clark present in 2010 when he co-chaired an Asia Society process drive on participating Myanmar, or most lately the dearth of any discernable progress in participating with the SAC from former Indonesian military basic Agus Widjojo.
Second, rewire a wholly new method, with a brand new mandate immediately from the Secretary Basic and a better rapport with the SG’s workplace. The necessity for reform has been obvious for a few years, however even tinkering with buildings within the UN is seen as disruptive. If Heyzer’s failure ought to spur something, it’s the necessity for a real reimagining of the position, and what its long-term utility may very well be for the UN’s help to Myanmar. One dimension may very well be the whole restructuring of the UN’s presence in Myanmar, discarding half of the operational companies and paring down presence and operations to handle quick humanitarian and growth wants associated to livelihoods, well being, schooling and emergency aid. This could alleviate the funding hole for donors who’ve already invested in multi-donor funds. The present management below Ramanathan Balakrishan must be radically reconstituted, and a steadiness sought between operational realities and high-level mediation efforts.
Third, contemplate a collective effort of a contact group of a number of officers, increasing the crew from a naked bones operation (though one I’m sure properly remunerates the gamers no matter their 1-0 scorecard) to a number of high-level actors. Nothing limply ineffectual just like the “Group of Buddies of Myanmar” that the UN tried earlier than, following the 2007 demonstrations and crackdown, involving some 14 nations. Nevertheless, this shouldn’t be a consortium of current envoys or level individuals such because the Norwegian envoy, or Igor Driesmans, the European Union envoy, however a gaggle of upper degree officers who can work together with a number of actors.
These consultations should be broad and inclusive, particularly the resistance actors in EAOs, the NUG and rising political forces such because the Karenni State Interim Government Council (IEC) and new configurations such because the Sagaing Discussion board. Nevertheless, simply the convening of such a discussion board inside the constraints of the UN is devilishly tough with protocol, egos and above all competing state pursuits. Have a look at one assortment of “Group of Buddies” assembly memos from 2009, which echoes the deadlock of 2023, and resist the exhausting information that change in Myanmar didn’t come about from exterior strain or help.
Or, fourth, do nothing. Simply inform the SAC that they’re not definitely worth the bother. Alleviate the diplomatic corps from having to expend vitality on supporting labored interventions that don’t have any likelihood of even minimal success. Clear the area for ASEAN to proceed to fail. Cease investing in false hope in Myanmar; it would do the standing of the UN some good, however probably not.
The Heyzer maneuver of early departure ought to be a name for reform and reengagement, to clear a clogged diplomatic passage. But it surely gained’t be.
David Scott Mathieson is an unbiased analyst engaged on battle, humanitarian and human rights on Myanmar.
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