A massive intelligence failure in Israel

Kinfolk and buddies mourn in the course of the funeral of Toni Levy who was killed by Hamas militants on October 7, in in Revivim in southern Israel.
| Photograph Credit score: AFP

No phrases could be sturdy sufficient to sentence the massacres carried out in Israel by Hamas, the Gaza-based Palestinian terrorist organisation. A humanitarian disaster is unfolding within the densely populated Gaza Strip as Israel, expectedly, responds with the complete may of its armed forces.

The dimensions and complexity of the assault indicated that Hamas had been meticulously planning it for months. The cross-border incursion throughout the hi-tech fence separating southern Israel from Gaza started with rocket fireplace and concerned using dinghies, bulldozers, bikes, paragliders, and drones bearing explosives. Hamas fighters focused civilian settlements and a army intelligence hub. Israel’s incapability to detect indicators of the upcoming assault and take preventive motion represents a catastrophic intelligence failure. Like 9/11 within the U.S. and 26/11 in India, October 7, 2023 in Israel signifies the horrors of terrorism.

Failure on a number of fronts

On the stage of intelligence assortment, Israel doesn’t appear to have had human spies penetrating Hamas in any significant method. This can be a acquainted shortcoming in intelligence companies worldwide, which search to recruit moles in ideologically pushed terrorist organisations. Israel’s formidable array of digital sensors and surveillance programs alongside the border didn’t work. This failure is being attributed to the excessive order of communications safety practiced by Hamas, which presumably prevented using telephones and different types of digital communication which can be prone to interception. It has been recommended that any motion of Hamas fighters close to the border earlier than the assault could have been discounted by Israeli screens as nothing greater than gamesmanship meant to check Israeli nerves. If that’s the case, Hamas appears to have succeeded in lulling Israel right into a false sense of normalcy.

Second, very like 50 years in the past, when an assault by the armies of Egypt and Syria in the course of the Yom Kippur pageant caught Israel unawares, the obtainable intelligence could have been misinterpreted. In 1973, Israeli defence intelligence had assessed that Egypt and Syria weren’t prone to resort to struggle till they upgraded their air drive, though Mossad chief Zvi Zamir, whose agent within the Egyptian management had warned him of an imminent assault, had knowledgeable Prime Minister Golda Meir of the identical. In at the moment’s context, Israeli intelligence could have believed that Hamas’ train of political management over Gaza since 2007 had made the group pragmatic and that continued monetary support from Qatar and the grant of permits to Palestinian day by day wagers to work in Israel had been adequate incentives for Hamas to chorus from initiating large-scale battle. Any proof of assault preparations by Hamas might have been underplayed because of this ‘affirmation bias’.

Essentially the most critical cost of failure pertains to the weakening of establishments and the politicisation of intelligence. The gravamen of this cost is that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu cynically pursued a coverage of ‘divide and conquer’ by propping up the Islamist Hamas to undercut its rival and secular-nationalist Palestinian faction Fatah, which workout routines a semblance of management over the West Financial institution by way of the Palestinian Authority. In contrast to Hamas, which stands for the destruction of the Jewish state, the Palestinian Authority favours a negotiated, two-state answer. Mr. Netanyahu is alleged to have employed the tactic of undermining the Palestinian Authority to scuttle the two-state answer by arguing that Israel has no credible ‘accomplice for peace’ among the many Palestinians; in impact, making Palestine a ‘downside with no answer.’ This ploy enabled him to retain the help of the right-wing and non secular events, which his coalition authorities had been depending on for its survival. Representatives of those events in his authorities additionally demanded extra assets for policing the occupied West Financial institution the place Israeli settlers, primarily right-wing supporters, dwell among the many Palestinians who’re in a majority. Israel’s safety companies might have been blind-sided by these political pressures and brought their eyes off the risk from Hamas.

Hamas’ goal

What did Hamas hope to realize by way of this assault? Was it to remind the world of the Palestine situation amid the unprecedented thaw in relations between Israel and the Arab states together with Saudi Arabia? Was it retribution for the ache inflicted by Israel on Palestinians? Or was it to puncture the parable of Israel’s invincibility? Was the operation green-lighted at current conferences in Lebanon between representatives of Hamas and Hezbollah, and Iranian Brigadier Esmail Qaani, as some experiences recommend? Or was it the unique handiwork of Hamas ‘hard-liners’ led by Muhammad Diab Al-Nasri and Yahya Sinwar? Did the ‘judicial reforms’ of the Netanyahu authorities, which had a corrosive affect on Israel’s army preparedness, embolden Hamas? Can a coverage of eliminating Hamas, the central goal of Israel’s anticipated floor offensive in Gaza, succeed? Do the U.S.’s army marketing campaign in Afghanistan, Israel’s expertise in southern Lebanon, or the persistence of the ideology of the Islamic State regardless of the bodily eradication of its so-called Caliphate provide any classes on this regard? Particular solutions to those questions could solely emerge with time, probably after a full-fledged inquiry is held in Israel. At a extra basic stage, the newest outbreak of violence reminds us but once more that intractable conflicts steeped in many years of bloodshed could be resolved solely by way of negotiation and dialogue between the events involved. The appliance of drive and extra drive by one aspect or the opposite can’t be the reply.

Ramanathan Kumar is former Particular Secretary, R&AW. Views are private