Myanmar Military Unable to Counter Resistance Offensive

It has been greater than 10 days for the reason that Brotherhood Alliance launched its Operation 1027 in northern Shan State in japanese Myanmar. To date, junta boss Min Aung Hlaing has solely been capable of concern verbal threats to strike again on the tripartite navy alliance made up of the Myanmar Nationwide Democratic Alliance Military (MNDAA), the Ta’ang Nationwide Liberation Military (TNLA) and the Arakan Military (AA).

Largest problem since coup  

The regime misplaced round 100 outposts in every week, and the ethnic alliance seized a haul of weapons. The junta’s bases in Kunlong, Monekyat, Nanbeng (on Lashio-Tangyan Street) and Monekoe had been the one ones that managed to withstand the offensive, with the regime shedding most of its outposts within the space with a pace nobody beforehand imagined attainable. The regime has additionally misplaced not less than six tanks and armored autos, and the Myanmar navy has admitted it now not has management of Chin Shwe Haw, Pansai and Phaung Sai cities.

The ethnic alliance has taken management of Hsenwi north of the Namtu River, however junta troops preserve a defensive place south of the river. Some junta outposts have fallen in Monekoe, however the junta hill-top outpost that homes the tactical command stays intact.

Communication networks in northern Shan State have been disrupted, border commerce via the one hundred and fifth Mile Camp, Muse, Jinsanjiao and Chin Shwe Haw has halted, and junta authorities staff have fled their workplaces.

The regime has solely been capable of preserve its administrative mechanism in Lashio, Hsipaw, Tangyan, Hopan and Panlong, and has misplaced management of many cities together with Chin Shwe Haw, Kunlong, Hsenwi, Kutkai, Muse, Pansai, Paungsai, Kyaukme and Nawngkhio in northern Shan State.

Myanmar navy’s response

The Myanmar navy has airlifted reinforcements to Lashio and Kunlong in addition to to the sixteenth Navy Operations Command within the south of Hsenwi. Additionally it is airlifting and parachuting meals provides and ammunition to its outposts in northern Shan State which were reduce off by the ethnic alliance.

It additionally dispatched some fight forces together with tank models from Pyin Oo Lwin in Mandalay Area to assault Nawnghkio in northern Shan, however the reinforcements had been intercepted by mixed forces of the Mandalay Individuals’s Protection Power and the TNLA and haven’t been capable of advance to the city.

The regime continues to be struggling to mount a counterattack almost two weeks after the launch of the offensive.

Operation 1027 has once more highlighted the Myanmar navy’s severe scarcity of personnel. Junta reinforcements airlifted to Lashio come from southern Shan and Kayah (or Karenni) states. The troops dispatched from Pyin Oo Lwin are from the a hundred and first Mild Infantry Division primarily based in Pakokku however quantity lower than 150, and it is vitally unlikely they may have the ability to repulse the resistance assaults and push their method via to Nawnghkio.

The regime shouldn’t be able to usher in as many reinforcements as it will like into northern Shan State. Preventing a multi-front battle in Kachin, Karen and Chin states and Magwe, Sagaing, Mandalay, Bago and Tanintharyi areas, it may not wish to threat new fronts in Rakhine and southern Shan states. Rakhine State is residence to the AA, which is a member of the Brotherhood Alliance, whereas the Shan State Progress Social gathering (SSPP), an ally of the Brotherhood Alliance, has a powerful presence in southern Shan State.

With the Kachin (Kachin Independence Military), Ta’ang (TNLA) and Kokang (MNDAA) ethnic armed teams having seized one space after one other in northern Shan State, the SSPP may not be prepared to simply sit and watch on the sidelines. Notably, whereas the AA has overtly admitted that it’s concerned in preventing not solely in Kachin but in addition in northern Shan State and Sagaing Area, the regime has blamed the KIA, MNDAA and TNLA for the offensives however has not mentioned a single phrase in regards to the AA.

The Myanmar navy as soon as refused to permit the AA to take part in national-level peace talks referred to as the Union Peace Convention, demanded its disarmament and compelled the then-civilian authorities—which it later ousted—to declare it a terrorist group. However its unwillingness to complain in regards to the Rakhine ethnic armed group now is a sign that the Myanmar navy dreads opening a brand new entrance in Rakhine, and is wanting personnel.

The regime, apparently additionally involved that the United Wa State Military and Nationwide Democratic Alliance Military—political allies of the Brotherhood Alliance—will be a part of the offensive, lately re-blocked roads between Mongla and Kengtung.

Additionally it is reportedly arranging to collect round 20 battalions, or over 20,000 troops, to strike again towards Operation 1027.

The mixed forces of the Brotherhood Alliance, Individuals’s Protection Power, Individuals’s Liberation Military and Burma Individuals’s Liberation Military at the moment preventing in northern Shan State whole round 20,000. So, the regime must mobilize not less than 20,000 troops. Nonetheless, the escalating preventing in Kachin, Karen, Kayah and Chin states and Sagaing, Magwe, Mandalay and Bago areas means the regime will possible not have the option to take action. Furthermore, the character of the preventing has modified in Sagaing and Magwe areas, with resistance forces now aiming to grab cities and extra strategic junta bases. That is nicely past what the junta’s air pressure can deal with, to not point out its floor reinforcements.

In response, the Myanmar navy has advised its troops manning smaller outposts to retreat and be a part of larger strongholds. It isn’t able to take again management of the Muse-Chin Shwe Haw highway, a key route for border commerce with China, not to mention recapture all of the outposts seized by the Brotherhood Alliance.

Namhkam and Monekoe are additionally below siege, and the regime has not but been capable of ship reinforcements.

Ceasefire?

Spokespeople for China’s Overseas Ministry have twice referred to as for an finish to the preventing in northern Shan State and for dialogue.

It is just pure that China needs stability alongside its border, and a resumption of border commerce. However it’s unlikely that the preventing in northern Shan State will come to an finish within the close to future.

The Brotherhood Alliance has seized cities and over 100 outposts. It’s unlikely that it’ll withdraw from them to carry talks with the regime. For its half, the regime can’t hand over on attempting to take again the cities, as a result of that may imply ceding management of border commerce with China to the alliance. So it should try to retake the cities and outposts.

Secondly, it appears Operation 1027 has not but achieved its navy goal. The Brotherhood Alliance apparently needs to ascertain a contiguous space below its de facto management.

Below such circumstances, it’s unlikely that the regime and the Brotherhood Alliance will cease preventing in northern Shan State and meet round a desk.

Moe Sett Nyein Chan is a navy analyst.