North Korea unveiled “new” missile developments in September and October that had been incremental enhancements of prior techniques fairly than dramatically new packages. The brand new Hwasong-20 (HS-20) solid-propellant road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) doesn’t seem to supply a lot over the sooner HS-19, which it strongly resembles, though it might be extra appropriate for a future multiple-warhead payload. The Hwasong-11E mounts a hypersonic glide car (HGV) on a previous, bigger, modified model of the KN-23 short-range ballistic missile (SRBM). If that is efficiently developed it might present solely a marginal improve to the present KN-23 power’s capability to evade alliance missile defenses. The North additionally displayed a brand new modular launch car that may carry various combos of battlefield bombardment rockets and the present 110 km-range HS-11D SRBM, bettering frontline commanders’ focusing on flexibility. And it underscored the persevering with significance of land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) to enhance ballistic missiles and enhance power diversification and survivability.
The shortage of actually “new” developments shouldn’t be stunning given prior enhancements to the massive number of missile techniques the North has unveiled since 2019. Pyongyang now possesses up to date, mature missile techniques throughout your complete vary spectrum, and future enhancements are thus more likely to be incremental. Though one ought to by no means rule out surprises, potential future multiple-warhead payloads and missile subs sufficiently big for yet-to-be-tested intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are nearly the one huge footwear left to drop.
“New” Strong ICBM: Ready for a Payload?
North Korea progressively rolled out between September 2 and October 10 what it termed the brand new HS-20 solid-propellant road-mobile ICBM. The “next-generation” missile was first talked about in a September 2 press report of a “high-thrust solid-fuel engine with the composite carbon fiber materials” reportedly floor (static) examined eight occasions and supposed to be used within the Hwasong-19 cellular stable ICBM that has been flight-tested as soon as in October 2024, in addition to the HS-20.
A ninth static check of the motor, reportedly “the final one within the improvement course of,” occurred on September 8, in response to North Korean press. Related pictures confirmed a first-stage motor of roughly the identical diameter however barely longer than that of the unique HS-19, suggesting the HS-20 and the longer term modified HS-19 utilizing this stage can have extra thrust than the unique HS-19. North Korea claims the motor will produce about as a lot thrust because the US Eighties Peacekeeper ICBM’s first stage.
Images launched on October 5 of the “milit ary {hardware} exhibition Protection Growth-2025” in Pyongyang confirmed what turned out to be the HS-20 missile subsequent to its 11-axle transporter-erector-launcher (TEL or road-mobile launcher) carrying an HS-20 missile canister. Analysts initially recognized these as being for the HS-19 given their similarity to that missile system, which additionally makes use of an 11-axle TEL. The attribution to HS-20 was confirmed when the same-type TEL and canister participated within the October 10 parade in Pyongyang marking the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Employees’ Celebration of Korea and had been recognized as being for the HS-20. In comparison with the unique HS-19, the HS-20 missile seems to have roughly the identical dimensions however a extra bulbous payload shroud (nostril cone) and seems to lack thruster ports on the third stage and payload shroud. The missile canister has a blunter nostril cap as effectively. The principle distinction within the TEL is the shortage of lifting arms to erect the missile canister alongside the aspect of the car; these presumably have been relocated beneath the canister.
Implications. The HS-20 doesn’t seem to supply a lot over the unique HS-19, and the North’s suggestion that there can be a future HS-19 model utilizing the identical new, probably longer first stage additional reduces the potential benefits of the brand new missile. It’s even unclear whether or not the HS-20 can be a “new kind” in any respect, or simply an HS-19 variant up-named for political/propaganda functions. Additionally left unclear is what ICBM or space-launch car can be related to a fair longer, 12-axle TEL chassis pictured within the North Korean press in September 2024; what has now turned out to be the HS-20 was broadly anticipated to go along with that longer TEL.
Assuming the brand new motor does give the HS-20 extra increase functionality than the unique HS-19, probably the most logical use for that elevated capability stays carrying a a number of independently targetable reentry car (MIRV) payload. It’s because each the unique HS-19 and even the sooner HS-18 stable cellular ICBM already can attain targets all through the US with single warheads.
The blunter payload shroud on the HS-20 would extra simply accommodate the blunter, Sixties-style reentry automobiles (RVs) that North Korea in all probability deploys on its ICBMs to have adequate confidence they may survive reentry at operational ranges regardless of the shortage of flight testing to such ranges. Whereas the shortage of seen thruster ports on the entrance finish of the HS-20 missile seen on October 5 might recommend it is going to carry a special, unMIRVed payload from the MIRV-associated HS-19, it might be that the HS-20 show missile lacked all the options seen on the dwell model or that the thrusters are hid behind blow-out ports not seen within the pictures.
Among the uncertainty concerning the comparative benefits of the HS-20 must be clarified if or when the missile is flight-tested which, based mostly on the monitor report of earlier newly-revealed North Korean ICBMs might happen inside a number of months—or under no circumstances. In any case, the important thing factor that will make the HS-20 (or the HS-19, for that matter) considerably add to the North Korean missile menace could be the deployment of a MIRV payload. And the North has but to efficiently flight-test one, regardless of a claimed MIRV check in June 2024 that in all probability failed and the possible presence of a MIRV-associated post-boost car (PBV) on the only real HS-19 flight-test that apparently didn’t launch a number of RVs. MIRVing is a demanding expertise, and at the very least a number of profitable MIRV payload checks over at the very least a number of years are possible wanted. Russian might considerably speed up the timeline however wouldn’t obviate the possible want for at the very least a number of profitable MIRV flight checks.
New SRBM Variant: Does its Payload Make Sense?
The early October Protection Growth-2025 exhibition a nd October 10 parade additionally featured a brand new variant of the KN-23 SRBM household geared up with a hypersonic glide car (HGV). The variant, designated Hwasong-11E (HS-11E), apparently makes use of the booster and 5-axle TEL of the bigger, heavier-payload model of the KN-23 (designated HS-11C) first flown in March 2021. As with different KN-23 road-mobile variants, the TEL carries two missiles side-by-side. The HGV is shorter than that on the HS-16 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that was additionally displayed and paraded in October, and has a special fin configuration. On October 23, North Korean press reported the day prior to this’s flight-test of “two hypersonic projectiles” to SRBM vary (some 390 km based mostly on the press description). The “new,” “essential,” and “cutting-edge” weapon system was not recognized. The related pictures didn’t present the missile or its launcher, and confirmed the affect of what seemed extra like an HS-11C traditional-style RV than an HGV.
Implications. Though the North Koreans not directly tried to affiliate the “projectiles” launched on October 22 with the brand new HS-11E, the accessible proof doesn’t allow confirming that affiliation. Moreover, solely the projectile launches had been reportedly detected by South Korea, not the HGV payload. The North’s press protection of the launches is very suggestive of political propaganda. It stays to be seen whether or not the HS-11E HGV was flight-tested, and if or when it is going to be.
Though HGVs provide the prospect of elevated maneuverability to additional complicate the duty of missile defenses, the comparatively low altitude, quick flight-time, and restricted booster power of an SRBM in comparison with an IRBM name into query the utility of an SRBM-class HGV. The KN-23 already is able to flying principally inside the ambiance and thus of maneuvering unpredictably and fairly extensively. Utilizing it to loft an HGV may permit maneuvers over a bigger space, however at SRBM ranges of efficiency the payload would bleed off power fairly shortly, and thus shortly lose its benefits over a standard KN-23 payload.
That mentioned, an SRBM HGV would expertise a lot much less demanding warmth and strain circumstances than an IRBM HGV. Longer-range HGVs have been troublesome even for China, Russia, and the US to develop, and there’s no clear proof that any of North Korea’s three IRBM HGV flight checks up to now have succeeded. The North may use an SRBM HGV as a check mattress or stepping-stone to help IRBM HGV improvement, both as an alternative of or along with growing a deployable SRBM model outright.
In any occasion, if Pyongyang intends to deploy the HS-11E as something aside from a propaganda device, a number of profitable flight-tests possible can be required. And if deployed it might present solely a marginal improve to the present KN-23 power’s capability to evade alliance missile defenses, though profitable deployment may increase the prospects of growing IRBM HGVs that will have extra defense-evading utility.
A New Modular Rocket/SRBM Launcher
The October 10 parade additionally featured a brand new 3-axle wheeled car carrying what gave the impression to be two launcher modules. Every module might carry 9 launch tubes for possible 240-mm multiple-launch rockets (MRLs), or one of many small solid-propellant Hwasong 11-D SRBMs first launched in April 2022.
Implications. Pyongyang might have adopted the modular launcher idea from the US MLRS and excessive mobility artillery rocket techniques (HiMARS), which can also carry varied combos of MRLs and SRBMs. The brand new launcher ought to improve the flexibleness of North Korean frontline battlefield commanders to tailor the weapons loadout to the mission by mixing and matching varied combos of the MRL and SRBM launch modules. Though the HS-11D can carry both nuclear or standard warheads, the very quick vary of the MRLs (40-60 km) makes it unlikely that HS-11Ds carried on the brand new launcher could be nuclear-armed. Nukes are prone to stand off farther from the entrance line to enhance survivability, benefiting from the SRBM’s 110 km vary. The brand new launcher underscores the essential standard function of North Korean SRBMs. (The North has displayed upwards of 100 devoted four-missile launchers for the HS-11D that will be a lot for the nuclear portion of the power.)
However Do Not Neglect About Cruise Missiles
The early October weapons exhibition displayed 5 totally different possible land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), in addition to two anti-ship cruise missiles. The LACMs in all probability embrace the previously-flown Hwasal-1, Hwasal-2, and Pulhwasal 3-31, in addition to the claimed Hwasal 1 Ra-2 with a “super-large” in all probability standard warhead. The id of the ultimate possible LACM, of the Hwasal kind, is unclear. North Korea introduced the October 28 launch of “sea-to-surface strategic cruise missiles” of a sort “improved for the launch from the ship” that had been “fired vertically” and flew for over 7,800 seconds (per a spread of about 1,500 km). The accompanying photograph confirmed a Hwasal-type LACM flying vertically, however not the launching vessel. Though the press article referred later to the 2 new destroyers North Korea has launched, it didn’t explicitly hyperlink them to the launch.
Implications. The show and missile launches underscore the significance of LACMs in augmenting ballistic missiles in North Korean theater strike roles, each standard and nuclear, in addition to the enhancement to power survivability supplied by various basing choices for LACMs on road-mobile launchers (which had been included within the October 10 parade), varied varieties of floor ships, and at the very least one kind of submarine.
The Backside Line: Incremental Adjustments to a Mature Missile Drive
Regardless of Kim Jong Un’s September 2025 foreshadowing of “many secret weapons,” the October exhibition and parade didn’t reveal any dramatically new ballistic missiles or LACMs. The “new” HS-20 ICBM appeared to supply little greater than the earlier HS-19, and the addition of an HGV to the brand new HS-11E variant of the KN-23 SRBM will possible make a marginal enchancment to missile protection penetration assuming it’s deployed. This shouldn’t be stunning given prior enhancements to the massive number of missile techniques the North has unveiled since 2019. Pyongyang now possesses up to date, mature missile techniques throughout your complete vary spectrum, and future enhancements are thus more likely to be incremental—because the North in all probability continues to extend the general variety of missiles and launchers deployed. Though one ought to by no means rule out surprises with the North Koreans, potential future MIRVed payloads and missile submarines sufficiently big for yet-to-be-tested intercontinental-range SLBMs (considered one of which was seen on the exhibition) are nearly the one huge footwear left to drop.
