On October 29, President Trump introduced that the USA will share nuclear propulsion applied sciences with South Korea and permit its navy to construct not less than one nuclear-powered submarine. Since then, the coverage neighborhood has been making an attempt to evaluate the feasibility and dangers of this growth, particularly whether or not China will undertake a punitive method towards South Korea because it did in 2016 after South Korea’s resolution to deploy the terminal excessive altitude space protection (THAAD) system.
Surprisingly, China’s response to the introduced plan has been gentle to this point, particularly in comparison with China’s response to AUKUS when it was first introduced. Three elements have contributed to the shortage of extreme response from Beijing, together with the shortage of prior data and the awkward timing, the consideration for a constructive relationship with the brand new Lee Jae Myung administration, and the perceived main variations from AUKUS. Nonetheless, it needs to be famous that the scenario is fluid and will quickly change.
China’s Gentle Official Response
Essentially the most official response from China to the nuclear sub announcement got here from the Chinese language Overseas Ministry on October 30. It was a comparatively gentle response: “China has taken observe of the associated growth and hope U.S. and South Korea will loyally observe their nonproliferation obligations and interact in actions conducive to regional peace and stability, slightly than the other.” On November 17, whereas answering a direct query about US Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle’s feedback on how a South Korean nuclear submarine might be a “international asset” and that countering China stays a prime US precedence, the Chinese language Overseas Ministry spokesperson maintained a comparatively low-key tone: “China has clearly expressed its place a number of instances and desires for U.S. and South Korea to deal with associated affairs with warning.”
The tone of the place is considerably extra reasonable in comparison with the Overseas Ministry’s response to AUKUS again in September of 2021 when it was first introduced. On September 30, 2021, then-Overseas Ministry spokesperson, Hua Chunying launched extreme assaults on AUKUS for its “grave dangers of nuclear proliferation, apparent violation of the spirit of The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), profound influence over worldwide nonproliferation regime and lifelike risk to regional peace and stability.” Wang Yi on the time additionally criticized AUKUS for its potential damages to the area in 5 completely different angles: nuclear proliferation, arms racing, regional tensions, regional bloc politics, and undermining the nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia. Hua additional identified that AUKUS served the US Indo-Pacific technique and tried to create an alternate order within the area.
Since then, China’s opposition to AUKUS has been constant. One week earlier than President Trump’s announcement on the nuclear-powered submarine for South Korea, the Overseas Ministry reiterated its “opposition to the camp confrontation, nuclear proliferation dangers and intensified arms race” embedded in AUKUS.
The Variations Between South Korea’s Nuclear Submarines and AUKUS
The sharp distinction of China’s reasonable response to the South Korea nuclear submarine and its intense criticism of AUKUS deserves scrutiny. Regional relationships might be an element. On the time AUKUS was launched in 2021, China had very completely different relationships with the important thing international locations concerned in AUKUS. By September 2021, US-China relations had been in a deeply hostile state whereas by October 2025, China is taking a look at nice “stabilization” of ties with US, hoping for a transactional relationship with President Trump. In September 2021, China additionally had strained and troubled relationships with each conservative governments in Australia and within the UK; whereas by October 2025, China has been hoping to maximise its enchancment of ties with the progressive Lee Jae Myung authorities in South Korea as Lee begins his five-year presidential time period.
Additionally it is noteworthy that Chinese language business specialists have mentioned intimately the technical variations between the 2 preparations, which seem like on the core of China’s slightly completely different evaluation of the South Korean submarine deal compared to AUKUS.
By way of the authorized association, China sees AUKUS as exploiting the exception clause of the NPT and counting on IAEA safeguards, whereas the South Korean deal is determined by its 123 Settlement for US-South Korea civil nuclear cooperation. The phrase “civil” carries significance right here, as China sees AUKUS as a direct switch of nuclear applied sciences and an enlargement of the US safety alliance, whereas the South Korean deal is extra of an “financial funding deal” to domesticate President Trump’s favor.
Extra essential are the applied sciences and nuclear supplies concerned. China sees AUKUS as a a lot graver concern as a result of direct switch of weapon-grade uranium to Australia, whereas the South Korean submarine is anticipated to make the most of small modular reactor (SMR) applied sciences that can produce low enriched uranium and carries a lot much less danger for proliferation of nuclear weapons. As such, AUKUS is outlined as direct proliferation of nuclear supplies whereas the South Korean nuclear submarine is seen as managed proliferation.
On this sense, not all nuclear-powered submarines are created equal. The South Korean plan is much less problematic, not less than for now, primarily based on info obtainable, as a result of it doesn’t contact the purple line of weapons-grade nuclear supplies and related designs and applied sciences. South Korea already has well-developed SMR applied sciences, and the plan to construct the submarine in the USA presents the association extra as an financial transaction than a real enlargement of the US-ROK safety alliance.
Awkward Timing for China
Whereas these technical specs got here later, a key issue that affected China’s speedy response to the announcement is the timing and sequence of the occasions main as much as the announcement in regards to the nuclear submarine. Xi’s state go to to South Korea was scheduled for APEC, and the nuclear submarine challenge had not been on China’s radar previous to the journey. The latest turbulence in US-ROK relations—concerning tariffs and the Hyundai employees—had additional created the impression that the US was not planning any important improve of relations with South Korea.
As such, the announcement by Trump befell round 6 pm ET, October 29, which was 7 am on October 30 in Seoul. That was only some hours earlier than Trump’s assembly with Xi, and the Chinese language didn’t have time to work this specific element into the assembly earlier than weighing its particulars and implications. Apparently, this element was not included in Xi’s assembly with President Lee on November 1, both.
However China does really feel performed by South Korea given the timing and the journey association, because it didn’t have the time to adequately assess and reply earlier than the choice was shoved down its throat. By the point the announcement was made, Xi was already in South Korea. With conferences scheduled with Trump and Lee, the Chinese language didn’t really feel they might, or ought to make a scene within the conferences organized. Additionally they felt performed as a result of there had been no indicator from Seoul that the announcement in regards to the nuclear submarine was going to occur. Though South Korea has been complaining to China about North Korea’s rising functionality for years, the Chinese language are used to the criticism and constantly and habitually ignore them.
Issues for Sino-ROK Relations
Whereas the Chinese language really feel Seoul exploited the chance supplied by APEC to lure China in a tough scenario, Beijing’s need to keep up a comparatively constructive starting of relations with the brand new Lee administration is clear. President Lee Jae Myung is only some months into his presidency, and Beijing seems to wish to keep away from a hostile starting that will bitter the general environment of bilateral relations for the rest of his time period. This consideration displays a sample of China’s larger degree of lodging of perceived transgression by new South Korean presidents. Within the early months of former President Yoon’s time in workplace, China additionally toned down its reactions to Yoon’s public positions on the peace and stability of Taiwan Strait, that are at all times seen by China as focused towards China’s refusal to desert use of drive for its unification.
In China, there’s a view {that a} progressive South Korean authorities will probably be extra China-friendly than a conservative one, so the Lee presidency is seen as a chance. This partially explains why the Chinese language narrative of the nuclear submarine focuses on the transactional nature of the deal between an investment-thirsty US and a nuclear submarine-thirsty South Korea. This identical narrative has made little or no reference to the deal’s implication for China’s near-term nationwide safety, more than likely as a result of the settlement isn’t seen by that lens, not less than for now.
The spat escalating between China and Japan because the APEC Summit, resulting from new Japanese Prime Minister Takaiichi’s touch upon Japan’s potential intervention in a Taiwan contingency, additional amplified the significance of making an attempt to affect Seoul’s potential alignment with China. Inside Northeast Asia, South Korea’s delicate stability of relations between China and Japan is at all times seen as a precedence challenge for China.
Future Chinese language Reactions
Identical to China was unable to drive South Korea to desert its deployment of the THAAD system, choices are restricted for China to successfully reverse the Korean and American resolution in regards to the nuclear submarine. China had engaged in a prolonged marketing campaign to form South Korea’s resolution to deploy the THAAD system earlier than 2016. Frustration over its failure led to China’s harsh response to and financial sanctions on South Korea. As Beijing has not engaged in a big push and pull with South Korea this time round, it’s unlikely to react as severely, for example, by imposing financial sanctions.
Nonetheless, as South Korea’s largest neighbor, buying and selling companion, and potential safety problem, China maintains leverage over South Korea. Within the Chinese language view, South Korea exploited China and its timing of scheduled diplomatic occasions in South Korea. Beijing sees Seoul’s logic in addressing the North Korea safety risk, however doesn’t settle for their reasoning on how this resolution might push China to behave extra assertively towards North Korea. In China’s view, any strengthening of South Korea’s safety ties with the USA will solely push China nearer to North Korea. In consequence, China will probably be much less restrictive the following time Pyongyang pushes Seoul round. That is the dilemma of South Korea’s nationwide safety technique.
As extra particulars in regards to the deal emerge, significantly on its technical specs and potential implications for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Beijing might develop a extra adamant and punitive response.
