In his January 2021 report back to the Eighth Celebration Congress of the Korean Employees’ Celebration, Kim Jong Un set out objectives to develop 13 beforehand unrevealed nuclear and missile weapons techniques.[1] 4 of these 13 techniques in all probability have been operationally deployed over the next 5 years, two could at present be operational, three are present process testing, and the standing of the remaining 4 is unknown. These outcomes mirror the excessive precedence and useful resource allocations, regular efforts, and decided overseas know-how acquisitions North Korea had been making since effectively earlier than the Celebration Congress fairly than new ambitions.
Strong-propellant intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), tactical nuclear weapons, and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)—all in all probability deployed since January 2021—have made an important contributions to North Korea’s army capabilities. Of the opposite techniques, multiple-warhead strategic missiles would supply the best potential to extend the North’s nuclear strike functionality. Many of the remaining techniques in Kim’s report would make solely incremental contributions to the various pressure of road-mobile ballistic missiles and fission nuclear warheads North Korea has been deploying for over 30 years.
The Ninth Celebration Congress anticipated inside a number of weeks ought to present additional insights into the continued improvement applications and any new program objectives, given Kim’s January 2026 assertion that the upcoming Congress “will make clear the next-stage plans for additional bolstering up the nation’s nuclear conflict deterrent.”
Operationally Deployed (4 of 13 techniques)
Strong ICBMs. Kim in January 2021 set a job to “push forward with the event of solid-fuel engine-propelled inter-continental … floor ballistic rockets as scheduled.” North Korea’s first solid-propellant ICBM, the Hwasong-18 (HS-18), was initially flight-tested in April 2023 and doubtless was operationally deployed by December 2023. An extended strong ICBM, the Hwasong-19, had its first and so far solely flight-test in October 2024. The North displayed the “subsequent technology” HS-20 strong ICBM, purportedly with a extra highly effective first stage motor, in October 2025, and indicated that very same motor could be utilized in an upgraded model of the HS-19. The arrival of strong ICBMs is a notable achievement underscoring North Korea’s prowess in solid-propellant know-how established by way of a extremely profitable sequence of strong short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) developed since 2019. Solids are simpler and safer to function within the subject than road-mobile liquid missiles, and have a smaller logistical footprint that makes them considerably much less weak to detection when field-deployed.
Tactical nuclear weapons. Kim’s January 2021 report was the primary to set out tactical nuclear weapons as a improvement goal; Kim additionally claimed the North had the know-how to “miniaturize, lighten and standardize” nuclear weapons. By Fall 2022, the North was emphasizing that it had an operationally deployed, dependable, and diversified supply functionality for such weapons. In March 2023, Pyongyang revealed a tactical nuclear weapon designated Hwason-31 mentioned for use interchangeably with a number of various kinds of supply techniques (i.e., “standardized”). In response to the Institute for Science and Worldwide Safety, the warhead had an outer diameter of some 40-45 cm and an estimated yield of about 10 kilotons. Exterior analysts broadly assess that such a warhead is inside North Korea’s capabilities given the nuclear testing it has already carried out, even when the Hwason-31 itself has apparently not finest examined. Thus, it’s affordable to imagine that some variety of “tactical nukes” have been produced and deployed.
Land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs). Kim reported that the North had “proceeded to develop…intermediate-range cruise missiles whose typical warheads are essentially the most highly effective on this planet.” Pyongyang’s first LACM reportedly was flight-tested in September 2021 with a claimed vary of 1,500 km. An up to date missile with a claimed 1,800 km vary was flown in January 2022. In February 2023, the North unveiled the Hwasal-2 LACM with a claimed 2,000 km vary (thus implying the sooner fashions had been Hwasal-1s), and advised road-mobile ground-launched LACMs had been operationally deployed. A 3rd mannequin, the “Pulhwasal-3-31,” was unveiled in January 2024, together with in a submarine-launched model (apparently fired from a torpedo tube), in addition to a “super-large” LACM warhead (virtually actually typical) in February 2024 for not less than the “Hwasal-1 Ra-3” missile. The North additionally has launched LACMs from floor combatant warships, together with the Amnok-class corvette in August 2023 and one of many new Choe Hyon-class destroyers in April 2025. LACMs present an necessary complement to North Korea’s a lot bigger pressure of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, in each nuclear and traditional roles. Basing LACMs on totally different land and sea platforms provides to the survivability, variety, and adaptability of the North’s general missile pressure. Low-flying, maneuverable LACMs will additional complicate Allied regional air and missile protection efforts— particularly in assaults coordinated with ballistic missiles.
Reconnaissance satellite tv for pc. Kim reported in January 2021 that the design of a army reconnaissance satellite tv for pc had been accomplished and it was wanted “within the close to future.” After the North reported launches of testbed boosters for recon satellite tv for pc improvement in February and March 2022 (which the US revealed really had been associated to the HS-17 ICBM), Pyongyang tried an unsuccessful launch of the “Malligyong-1” reconnaissance satellite tv for pc in Could 2023. The launch used the brand new three-stage liquid-propellant “Chollima-1” area launch automobile (SLV), with its first stage primarily based on the HS-17. After one other failed try in August 2023, the Chollima-1 efficiently orbited a Malligyong-1 in November 2023. The North introduced in Could 2024 that the launch of a “Malligyong-1-1” reconaissance satellite tv for pc on a “new sort service rocket” with a “newly developed liquid oxygen + petroleum engine” failed throughout first stage operation. There have been no subsequent recognized launch makes an attempt regardless of Kim’s January 2021 objective and the North’s subsequent said intentions to launch further recon satellites. Such satellites stay a precedence, nonetheless, and so additional launches are extremely possible. It’s affordable to imagine that the present stage of North Korean know-how would yield an imaging satellite tv for pc with modest decision, serving to Pyongyang detect and monitor a buildup of allied forces however in all probability making solely a modest contribution to all the opposite intelligence data North Korea receives. Whether or not Russia has or will help this program is unclear, as is the affect of any such help. The North would want an operational community of 5 or so satellites for normal protection.
Probably Operational (2 of 13 techniques)
Nuclear-armed UUV. Kim’s report included a job to “possess … an underwater-launch nuclear strategic weapon which shall be of nice significance in elevating the long-range nuclear placing functionality.” On the time, Kim was assumed to be referring to an ICBM-range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM; see beneath). However looking back, he in all probability was referring to the “Haeil” nuclear-armed unmanned underwater automobile (UUV) unveiled in March 2023. A “Haeil-5-23” variant was introduced in January 2024, and Haeils have featured in North Korean parades as lately as October 2025. It’s unknown whether or not North Korea considers the Haeil operational, what number of are deployed, or the place the UUVs could be launched from. In any case, the Haeil would nonetheless be considerably inferior to North Korea’s nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles when it comes to time-to-target, accuracy, and lethality. Its vary limits it to coastal targets in South Korea and southeast Japan, the place it might be weak to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assaults. The UUV would seem to have way more political than army utility, permitting the North to point out it has numerous nuclear supply capabilities that can not be prevented from retaliating.
Medium-range recon drones. Kim’s report referred to the necessity to “conduct in actual earnest an important analysis to develop reconnaissance drones and different technique of reconnaissance able to exactly reconnoitering as much as 500 km deep into the entrance.” In July 2023, the North revealed at an arms expo and parade the medium-sized “Saetbyol-9 multi-purpose assault drone” akin to the US MQ-9 Reaper, and the large-sized “Saetbyol-4 strategic reconnaissance drone” akin to the US RQ-4 World Hawk. A number of of every sort of unmanned air automobile (UAV) have subsequently been proven in North Korean media, most lately at a show Kim visited in honor of the 80th anniversary of the Korean Folks’s Air Power in November 2025. It’s unknown what number of of those UAVs have been or shall be produced, and extra importantly how succesful their reconnaissance sensors and underwing typical weapons are. However the two new sorts of UAV would supply North Korea with worthwhile new capabilities in comparison with its earlier drones if they’re produced and deployed in enough numbers, though they might be extraordinarily weak over allied airspace in wartime.
Underneath Testing (3 of 13 techniques)
Medium-sized submarine. Kim’s report famous that “the usual of the objective within the modernization of medium-sized submarine was set appropriately and it was transformed experimentally to open up a brilliant prospect for remarkably enhancing the prevailing subsurface operational capabilities of our navy.” Looking back, it’s now clear Kim was foreshadowing the conventionally-powered Sinpo-C class “tactical nuclear assault submarine” that was rolled out of its development corridor in September 2023. That sub, initially proven by the North underneath development in July 2019, was virtually actually remodified since then (i.e., “transformed experimentally”) from a configuration mounting three medium-sized ballistic missiles in its sail to the in the end revealed lengthened hull having a “turtleback” part aft of the sail with launch tubes giant sufficient for 4 small-to-medium ballistic missiles and 6 possible land-attack cruise missiles. The Sinpo-C has nonetheless not but set out on sea trials, 6-12 months of which typically are required previous to deployment. Though Kim advised all the North’s remaining Romeo-class conventionally-powered subs could be transformed to Sinpo-Cs, it’s not clear whether or not every other conversions at present are underneath approach.
Hypersonic glide autos. Kim reported that the North had “completed analysis into creating… hypersonic gliding flight warheads for new-type ballistic rockets and was making preparations for his or her take a look at manufacture” and was to “develop and introduce hypersonic gliding flight warheads in a brief interval.” Pyongyang launched a medium-range liquid booster it referred to as “Hwasong-8” in September 2021 carrying an arrowhead-shaped hypersonic glide automobile (HGV)/increase glide automobile (BGV) with stubby wings. One other HGV was launched in April 2024 on the solid-propellant Hwasong-16 IRBM, with a repeat HS-16 HGV launch in January 2025. In October 2025, the North claimed to have launched “hypersonic projectiles” to SRBM vary, implying these had been the “Hwasong-11E,” a newly-exhibited system utilizing the bigger, heavier-payload model of the KN-23 SRBM (designated HS-11C) to hold a small HGV. The North additionally claimed to have launched an unidentified sort of hypersonic missile to a variety of 1000 km on January 4, 2026. Though the North now routinely shows and parades theater missiles carrying HGVs, there is no such thing as a clear open-source proof it has ever efficiently flown one. HGVs are a really demanding know-how given the necessity to deal with the temperatures and pressures of sustained hypersonic flight, compounded by the maneuvering wanted to evade missile defenses (the comparative benefit of HGVs over different payloads). Pyongyang would possible want not less than a number of profitable flight-tests to actually develop HGVs. It would select for political and propaganda causes, or in an effort to complicate allied planning, to assert HGVs are deployed regardless that they continue to be underneath improvement.
A number of-warhead missiles. In 2021, Kim reported the North was within the ultimate stage of “conducting analysis into perfecting the steering know-how for multi-warhead rocket.” It’s doable that North Korean launches in February and March 2022, which the North mentioned included testing of “angle management techniques” for reconnaissance satellites however subsequently had been revealed by the US as possible supposed to check parts of what apparently was the HS-17 giant liquid ICBM, might have been helpful within the improvement of a post-boost automobile (PBV) to dispense a number of, independently-targetable reentry autos (MIRVs). In June 2024, the North claimed to have launched a testbed booster that allotted three reentry autos (RVs) and a decoy, however South Korean video of the launch exhibits it in all probability failed earlier than any objects might have been launched. Though the take a look at exhibits that North Korea stays dedicated to creating multiple-warhead missiles, not less than a number of profitable flight assessments over a minimal of some years would possible be required earlier than MIRVs might be deployed. Profitable MIRV improvement would underscore North Korea’s technical prowess, additional complicate the duty of allied missile defenses, and improve the variety of targets that its missile pressure can strike with a given variety of missiles and launchers.
Standing Unknown (4 of 13 techniques)
Nuclear-powered submarine. Kim Jong Un reported in January 2021 that “the design of latest nuclear-powered submarine was researched and was within the stage of ultimate examination…And the duties had been introduced as much as… possess a nuclear-powered submarine.” In September 2023, Kim said that “we must always give larger impetus to the constructing of nuclear-powered submarine [sic].” In January 2024, Kim reportedly “discovered intimately in regards to the constructing of a nuclear submarine… mentioned the problems associated to the constructing of a nuclear-powered submarine… indicated the speedy duties to be carried out by related sectors and state measures to be taken, and made an necessary conclusion on the methods to implement them.” In March 2025, Kim reportedly “discovered in regards to the constructing of a nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine, which is being pushed ahead in line with the choices of the Eighth [Party] Congress.” That report was accompanied by images that confirmed the decrease portion of a part of the hull of the reputed nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN). North Korean press in December 2025 reported on a latest go to by Kim to the development website for a “8,700-tonnage nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine.” Related images taken inside a development corridor confirmed a lot of the submarine wanting up from beneath.
Though presumably retouched, the brand new images seem credible. They reveal a excessive, extended-length sail containing 5-10 possible ballistic missile launch tubes. The excessive sail suggests the brand new sub is meant to accommodate SLBMs which can be for much longer in measurement—not less than 0.5 m and even 4.5 m longer—than the 13.5 m SLBM displayed by the North in April 2022, the longest seen thus far. An extended missile could also be wanted to achieve intercontinental vary, an goal set out by Kim in January 2021 (see beneath).
There isn’t any open-source reporting that North Korea has but constructed or examined a submarine nuclear reactor, and the brand new images don’t reveal whether or not one is put in within the new sub. At this level, the concept the hull is provided with an operable nuclear reactor ought to be regarded with nice skepticism, though this chance can’t be dominated out. There have been experiences alleging Russia offered the North Koreans a reactor or intensive technical help, however these experiences haven’t been corroborated. Even when the sub is reactor-equipped, a yr or two of becoming out in all probability could be required earlier than it rolled out of the development corridor prepared to start sea trials, with further time required to achieve operational standing.
ICBM-range SLBM. Kim in January 2021 set a job to “push forward with the event of solid-fuel engine-propelled inter-continental underwater … rockets as scheduled.” North Korea has not flight-tested a real submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)—versus a sub-launched KN-23 SRBM—since October 2019, and that was the medium-range Pukguksong-3 strong SLBM. The very best recognized candidate for a North Korean strong ICBM-range SLBM is the unnamed missile paraded in April 2022. That missile was about 2.21 m in diameter and 13.2 meter lengthy, roughly the scale of Russian, Chinese language, and Western ICBM-range SLBMs. The the reason why the North has not but flight-tested this or one other such SLBM are unknown, however could also be associated to the present lack of a big sufficient submarine to function an operational deployment platform or (as famous above) that the North has shifted to creating an as-yet unseen longer SLBM.
ICBM accuracy. Kim’s January 2021 report “set a objective of…additional elevating the speed of precision adequate to strike and annihilate any strategic targets inside a variety of 15,000 kilometers with pinpoint accuracy.” Though the liquid Hwasong-17 and all the North’s strong ICBMs are assessed to have a variety of not less than 15,000 km, there is no such thing as a proof any of its ICBMs have what could be generally thought to be “pinpoint accuracy.” Pyongyang has not flown any ICBM on an operational trajectory that may allow drawing conclusions about accuracy at intercontinental vary. Its present ICBMs in all probability use blunt, sturdy RVs that present substantial confidence the payload would survive intercontinental-range reentry with out full-range testing—however that impose substantial accuracy penalties.
North Korea’s use of maneuvering reentry autos (MaRVs) on medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) may foreshadow a future ICBM MaRV with the potential for prime accuracy, however its ICBMs have but to be related or examined with MaRVs and the accuracy such MaRVs really might obtain at ICBM ranges is unclear. In any case, the North is unlikely to pursue a “counterforce” technique towards the continental US requiring excessive accuracy to destroy US ICBM silos and different hardened targets. A “countervalue” technique focusing on US cities and thus requiring solely modest ICBM accuracy is more likely. Kim’s claimed objective of “pinpoint accuracy” was thus more likely superior for political and propaganda functions than to posit a severe design goal for North Korean ICBMs.
Tremendous-large hydrogen bombs. In January 2021, Kim reported that Pyongyang had the know-how to “full the event of a super-large hydrogen bomb,” and that the power to “make nuclear weapons smaller and lighter…will make it doable to…constantly push forward with the manufacturing of super-sized nuclear warheads.” Since then, North Korean media has offered no extra data on this venture. Though the North claimed its January 2016 nuclear explosive take a look at and its ultimate such take a look at in September 2017 had been associated to thermonuclear (hydrogen) weapons, it’s unclear whether or not additional explosive testing could be required for Pyongyang to have the ability to deploy such weapons. The big, liquid-propellant Hwasong-17 ICBM first flight-tested in March 2022 could be superb for “super-large” warheads. Though such weapons would make nice city-busters, the North’s present fission warheads could effectively present an sufficient countervalue functionality towards US, Japanese, and South Korean cities.
The Backside Line
All 13 nuclear and missile techniques reported as a part of Kim Jong Un’s five-year plan had been virtually actually underneath improvement to numerous extents earlier than the 8th Celebration Congress in January 2021, and thus mirrored the excessive precedence and useful resource allocations, regular efforts, and decided overseas know-how acquisitions North Korea had been making within the previous years fairly than new ambitions. In addition they mirrored the maturity and pure diffusion of the Forties- to Nineteen Seventies-vintage applied sciences underlying these techniques. Nonetheless, the addition of strong ICBMs, tactical nuclear weapons, and LACMs to the North’s arsenal since January 2021 could make necessary contributions—assuming deployment in substantial quantity—to the credibility and survivability of its nuclear pressure, its choices for escalating and responding to escalation in a disaster or battle, and (for LACMs) its typical warfighting capabilities.
If the North can enhance the decision of its imagery reconnaissance satellites and put sufficient in orbit, it could make necessary enhancements in its situational consciousness and wartime focusing on capabilities. Of the developmental techniques, MIRVs supply the best potential to extend the North’s nuclear strike functionality assuming profitable testing and the manufacturing of sufficient nuclear warheads. Many of the different techniques not but deployed, even SSBNs carrying ICBM-range SLBMs, would make solely incremental contributions to the various pressure of road-mobile ballistic missiles and fission nuclear warheads North Korea has been deploying for over 30 years. The Ninth Celebration Congress anticipated inside a number of weeks ought to present additional insights into the continued improvement applications and any new program objectives, given Kim’s January 2026 assertion that the upcoming Congress “will make clear the next-stage plans for additional bolstering up the nation’s nuclear conflict deterrent.”
