On Might 17, the President promulgated an ordinance rising the sanctioned power of the Supreme Court docket from 34 to 38 judges. The transfer got here simply days after the Union Cupboard authorised the Supreme Court docket (Variety of Judges) Modification Invoice, 2026, stating that the addition of 4 judges would allow the highest courtroom to facilitate “speedy justice”. On Might 27, the Supreme Court docket Collegium beneficial the elevation of 4 Excessive Court docket Chief Justices and senior advocate V. Mohana as judges of the highest courtroom. Based on the Nationwide Judicial Knowledge Grid, pendency earlier than the SC at the moment stands at 93,966 circumstances. Is rising the highest courtroom’s power an efficient option to cut back pendency? Prashant Reddy T. and Swapnil Tripathi focus on the query in a dialog moderated by Aaratrika Bhaumik.
Was the ordinance route crucial to extend the highest courtroom’s sanctioned power?
Prashant Reddy: No. With Parliament set to convene inside weeks, the federal government might simply have launched the proposal by way of the strange legislative course of. In any occasion, earlier Payments rising the sanctioned power of the highest courtroom have usually handed with minimal debate. Actually, in 2009, the federal government reportedly launched an analogous measure by way of a cash Invoice owing to its numerical drawback within the Rajya Sabha. Resorting to an ordinance for a measure of this nature deepens institutional scepticism and fuels pointless hypothesis in regards to the motives of the transfer.
Does the Supreme Court docket’s willingness to entertain numerous Particular Depart Petitions (SLPs) contribute to the pendency?
Swapnil Tripathi: Sure. The Constituent Meeting envisaged that the Supreme Court docket would train appreciable restraint, significantly in invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction below Article 136 of the Structure. SLPs had been conceived as a treatment to be exercised sparingly. Over time, nonetheless, a considerable portion of the Supreme Court docket’s docket has come to be dominated by SLPs. What’s much more regarding is the courtroom’s persistent reluctance to formulate clear pointers governing the train of this jurisdiction. The absence of any significant pointers has contributed to the very accumulation of arrears the establishment is now struggling to handle.
PR: The problem with Article 136 is that there has by no means been a transparent consensus, even inside the Constituent Meeting, on the exact function this jurisdiction was supposed to carry out. In most different frequent regulation jurisdictions, prime courts have advanced institutional filters to control discretionary appeals, aware of the finite judicial time accessible to them. They often confine themselves to probably the most contentious or jurisprudentially vital circumstances. In contrast, as lately as 2016, a Structure Bench of the Supreme Court docket declined to slim the scope of Article 136, observing that no effort ought to be made to limit the courtroom’s powers below the supply. The result’s an more and more unpredictable system by which outcomes usually seem contingent on the Bench earlier than which a matter is listed. This, in flip, fuels allegations of Bench fixing and corrupt itemizing practices, eroding the courtroom’s legitimacy within the eyes of the general public.
Ought to the Court docket confine itself primarily to constitutional circumstances to cut back backlog?
PR: No. Final 12 months, in Vijaya Financial institution & Anr. versus Prashant B. Narnaware, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court docket was referred to as upon to interpret Part 27 of the Indian Contract Act. The case was in regards to the validity of a bond clause; permitting a public sector financial institution to recuperate damages from an worker who resigned earlier than finishing a compulsory three-year service interval. Though framed as a contract regulation dispute, the difficulty went to the center of the best to work and carried vital implications for labour mobility and market competitors. Questions of regulation with such far-reaching penalties should interact the highest courtroom’s consideration. The actual concern just isn’t that the Court docket hears such circumstances, however the way it hears them. Issues involving substantial questions of regulation must be determined by bigger Benches to make sure doctrinal consistency.
ST: I agree. The Supreme Court docket was by no means envisaged as a constitutional courtroom alone. It was additionally designed to perform because the nation’s ultimate courtroom of attraction. Over time, nonetheless, its appellate jurisdiction has more and more overshadowed its function in deciding constitutional questions. On the similar time, the courtroom should be certain that the influx of routine appeals is diminished and that intervention is reserved for circumstances the place it’s genuinely warranted. I’d, nonetheless, add an vital caveat. The place courts are referred to as upon to resolve substantial questions of regulation, such issues ought ideally to be heard by bigger Benches to minimise inconsistencies in interpretation amongst coordinate Benches.
Will rising the Supreme Court docket’s sanctioned power result in extra conflicting rulings by coordinate Benches?
PR: Sure. A rise within the courtroom’s sanctioned power is prone to lead to higher doctrinal inconsistency, significantly when most judges sit in Division Benches of two. A bigger variety of Benches will inevitably lead to a higher variety of circumstances being entertained and, consequently, extra conflicting rulings by coordinate Benches. Additional, as soon as divergent views emerge amongst coordinate Benches and issues require reference to bigger Benches for authoritative decision, delays are prone to grow to be much more pronounced.
ST: I believe the polyvocality of the Supreme Court docket is certainly one of its strengths, however it works as a power solely when accompanied by judicial self-discipline. The 2 should complement one another. Judges could arrive at totally different conclusions on details, however the software of authorized rules should stay constant.
Does the federal government want a extra constant litigation coverage?
PR: The federal government was initially anticipated to introduce a Nationwide Litigation Coverage (NLP) to cut back the overwhelming quantity of circumstances involving the Union, State governments, and public sector undertakings that proceed to clog the judicial system. The federal government ultimately withdrew its assurance to introduce it, leaving unanswered questions on how choices referring to authorities litigation are literally taken. There are quite a few cases the place comparable circumstances stay pending earlier than totally different Excessive Courts, and as an alternative of permitting at the very least one Excessive Court docket to conclusively adjudicate the difficulty, the federal government information switch petitions earlier than the Supreme Court docket. The result’s that these circumstances usually stay pending earlier than the highest courtroom for a number of extra years.
ST: The federal government’s litigation technique usually seems to be pushed by a extremely result-oriented, case-to-case strategy fairly than any coherent coverage. Courts have repeatedly questioned why the federal government continues to pursue just about each dispute as much as the Supreme Court docket, even in circumstances the place its place is clearly unsustainable. There’s additionally a hanging lack of institutional consistency. Modifications in regulation officers usually result in shifts in authorized technique, with successive counsels typically advancing positions totally opposite to these taken earlier. Finally, it’s the particular person litigant, missing the State’s sources and institutional capability, who suffers probably the most.
What are the institutional reforms required?
ST: The pendency disaster can’t really be addressed except the Supreme Court docket develops a extra sturdy mechanism to filter out frivolous litigation. That is significantly vital within the context of Public Curiosity Litigations (PIL). The courtroom should strictly apply the rules laid down in State of Uttaranchal versus Balwant Singh Chaufal (2010), together with guaranteeing {that a} PIL is filed for a real public trigger and never pushed by private or political pursuits. As for circumstances already pending earlier than the courtroom, stricter time allocation for oral arguments is important. Higher reliance also needs to be positioned on written submissions in order that judicial time just isn’t consumed by extended hearings.
Is that this a chance to enhance gender illustration on the Bench?
PR: Sure. For my part, these 4 further positions ought ideally to be stuffed by ladies. There should even be higher transparency within the appointments course of.
ST: A standard justification provided for not appointing extra ladies judges is that there aren’t sufficient senior ladies judges within the Excessive Courts. However the conference of seniority has usually been relaxed with regards to appointing male judges to the Supreme Court docket.
Prashant Reddy T. is Authorized Educational and co-author of ‘Tareekh Pe Justice: Reforms for India’s District Courts’. Swapnil Tripathi leads Chakra, the constitutional regulation centre at Vidhi Centre for Authorized Coverage
