EU-China relations are being outlined in two very alternative ways on the identical time.
On June 29, throughout Chinese language Commerce Minister Wang Wentao’s go to to Brussels, the EU and China reached a mutually agreed new definition of their financial relations – “secure and balanced key buying and selling companions.” To present substance to the time period, the 2 sides launched a commerce and funding session mechanism (TIC), which consists of commerce and funding balancing, export controls, mental property rights, and WTO reform. This new definition has since appeared a number of occasions in Chinese language retailers and official statements, together with Folks’s Every day, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Chinese language readout of Dutch Commerce Minister Sjoerd Sjoerdsma’s go to to China.
But virtually on the identical time, a a lot tougher definition was rising from the European safety debate. Within the European Council’s newest official “evaluation of the EU’s strategic atmosphere,” China is described as “a essential long-term strategic problem,” and a “essential enabler for Moscow” within the Ukraine battle. This paper was endorsed by EU member states’ ambassadors on July 8 and reportedly adopted on the Overseas Affairs Council (FAC) on July 13.
The evaluation is an replace to the EU’s risk evaluation since 2022, during which China was nonetheless characterised consistent with the European Fee’s 2019 definition: “a associate for cooperation, an financial competitor and a systemic rival.”
These dynamics create a contradictory sign in immediately’s China-EU relationship. Economically, either side wish to stabilize and rebalance the connection as a way to forestall commerce tensions from turning right into a broader commerce battle. Strategically, nonetheless, the EU is shifting towards a extra specific safety framing of China, particularly within the context of the Russia-Ukraine battle. This case begs the query of whether or not two divergent definitions of the identical relationship can coexist.
The busy summer time of China-EU commerce negotiations confirmed that either side nonetheless wish to hold the financial relationship manageable. In a press convention held by the Chinese language Ministry of Commerce, the spokesperson introduced that the second spherical of TIC will probably be held in Beijing this fall, with EU Commerce Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič anticipated to make the journey to China. This is only one of a number of conferences and negotiations scheduled to occur earlier than the October deadline set by the European aspect for “tangible progress” on commerce; vice-minister degree conferences will probably be held in August and September.
Neither aspect expects a structural transformation of China’s manufacturing-based financial mannequin. As an alternative, they’re creating circumstances to reap lower-hanging fruit. First, China has dedicated to decreasing the deficit by importing EU items in Chinese language authorities procurement or state buying and selling, Denis Redonnet, the European Fee’s deputy director basic for commerce and financial safety, advised the European Parliament’s commerce committee. A “joint monitoring mechanism” will probably be mentioned earlier than the tip of July to observe will increase in Chinese language imports into Europe.
On the member-state degree, diplomatic and financial channels have additionally change into extra lively. Throughout Overseas Minister Wang Yi’s go to to Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway from July 2 to 7, China emphasised partnership, political dialogue, respect for core pursuits, and sensible cooperation. Inexperienced transition, innovation, and AI governance have been offered as promising areas for future engagement. The Dutch and Chinese language governments additionally dedicated to creating a positive atmosphere for enterprises to resolve the Nexperia dispute.
The message is evident: Even amid wider China-EU tensions, either side try to ease financial friction and protect areas of sensible cooperation.
This financial and diplomatic effort, nonetheless, is paralleled by a hardening in Europe’s notion of its safety atmosphere. The battle in Ukraine has deepened the divide between Europe and China, making Beijing’s relationship with Moscow a central obstacle to constructing nearer strategic and safety cooperation between the 2 sides. The EU has focused a number of China-based corporations in sanctions associated to Russia’s military-industrial complicated, whereas China has persistently denied offering navy help to Russia.
The image is extra difficult than a easy bifurcation into China-Russia versus Europe-Ukraine camps. Ukraine has reportedly been allowed to make use of a part of a 6 billion euro EU defense-loan tranche to purchase Chinese language-made drone parts. This exposes a paradox: China is seen as an enabler of Russia’s battle financial system, whereas European and Ukrainian protection provide chains should make the most of Chinese language parts.
As well as, the evaluation doc’s framing of China goes past the Russia-Ukraine context in 3 ways. First, it presents China as a part of a wider systemic competitors over world order, expertise and affect. Second, it highlights China’s geoeconomic leverage, together with its industrial scale, commerce place, essential uncooked supplies and chosen technological benefits. Third, it hyperlinks Europe’s safety extra on to the Indo-Pacific, arguing that tensions within the South and East China Seas or throughout the Taiwan Strait may have an effect on European safety, stability and prosperity.
Can the 2 definitions of China-EU relations – as “secure and balanced key buying and selling companions” and “essential long-term strategic” rivals – coexist? Tactically, sure. They may help either side hold channels open, handle disputes, and keep away from an uncontrolled spiral. Strategically, nonetheless, they can’t present a completely coherent foundation for the connection. China needs interdependence to be seen as a supply of stability, whereas the EU more and more sees some types of interdependence as sources of vulnerability.
At this stage, it stays unclear whether or not the Overseas Affairs Council’s description of China as “a essential long-term strategic problem” will develop right into a broader framework for outlining China-EU relations, in the identical means that the 2019 “associate, competitor and systemic rival” as soon as did. Nonetheless, the sign despatched by the FAC may nonetheless complicate the progress just lately made by the Directorate-Common for Commerce and Financial Safety of the European Fee and China’s Ministry of Commerce. On this sense, the stress lies not solely between the EU and China, but additionally inside Brussels: whereas one a part of the EU equipment is making an attempt to stabilize financial relations with Beijing, one other is framing China as one among Europe’s long-term safety considerations.
China’s response to those diverging narratives will probably be essential in defining the near-term trajectory of China-EU ties. Beijing might select to strategically downplay the EU’s new safety framing, particularly because it has not but attracted main public consideration, to maintain commerce negotiations on monitor. Nonetheless, if Beijing chooses to not downplay the wording, the brand new definition may change into a extra severe supply of friction and additional complicate an already tense China-EU relationship.
