Since President Donald Trump expressed his want to meet with North Korean chief Kim Jong Un earlier than the top of the yr, issues and criticism in each South Korea and america have outweighed optimism. Critics warn {that a} “Seoul bypass” might weaken the US-ROK alliance; that Trump might search nuclear arms management relatively than denuclearization; {that a} small deal would quantity to accepting North Korea’s nuclear standing; and that no deal is best than a small or dangerous one. Briefly, if full, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) and an enormous deal are unattainable, these critics contemplate the established order—successfully doing nothing—preferable to accepting one thing smaller.
CVID has lengthy been the popular strategy to the North Korean nuclear drawback. For greater than three many years, nonetheless, South Korean and US governments have pursued CVID by means of each substantial incentives and powerful sanctions and strain with out ever reaching that objective. By 2017, when North Korea carried out its sixth nuclear take a look at and test-fired its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), it had change into clear that this strategy had failed.
The “uncomfortable reality” in the present day is that North Korea is already nuclear-armed and that full denuclearization is unlikely for the foreseeable future. More and more, in each South Korea and america, denuclearization is being seen much less as a right away coverage goal and extra as a long-term objective, very like Korean reunification. The period of “residing with a nuclear North Korea” has already begun.
The query is whether or not one thing extra could be achieved past the established order however in need of denuclearization that might enhance the safety state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula, comparable to a nuclear “freeze.” Trump lately mentioned North Korea possesses “57 very highly effective nuclear weapons,” whereas quite a few open sources cite North Korean doubtless possessing sufficient nuclear materials for greater than 100 weapons. Extra troubling is North Korea’s continued growth of its nuclear materials manufacturing capabilities, growing its means to develop its nuclear weapon arsenal over time. At a January 2026 press convention, President Lee Jae Myung warned that Pyongyang was producing sufficient fissile materials for 10-to-20 nuclear weapons yearly. If that tempo continues, North Korea might possess 150-to-300 nuclear weapons inside a decade.
North Korea has strongly resisted the CVID strategy, and in the present day rejects negotiations premised on its denuclearization. Nonetheless, the US and its allies must be equally unwilling to just accept the nuclear establishment. Caught between these two realities, the instant goal must be to reopen political dialogue with North Korea to hunt constraints on North Korea’s nuclear improvement and growth to create the house for peace-building efforts to take maintain.
A Potential Opening for One other Trump-Kim Summit
Many consultants consider that regardless of Trump’s curiosity in one other summit, Kim Jong Un will stay unresponsive, and no summit will happen. There are good causes for this pessimism. Above all, Kim has not forgotten the humiliation of the fruitless Hanoi summit of February 2019, one thing he clearly doesn’t need to repeat. Since then, North Korea has consolidated its nuclear arsenal and drastically expanded its safety and financial cooperation with Russia and China. This makes the necessity for sanctions aid much less pressing, and the resumption of dialogue with Washington, who will need some form of nuclear and/or safety concessions, much less engaging.
Latest developments, nonetheless, counsel that one other summit stays potential. Trump has repeatedly emphasised his good relationship with Kim. Of late, he has notably shunned mentioning “denuclearization.” In mid-August, Trump introduced a significant discount in ongoing US-ROK joint army workouts, calling them “completely inappropriate and hostile.” The transfer appeared meant, no less than partly, to handle North Korea’s longstanding complaints about Washington’s “hostile coverage” and create a extra favorable surroundings for dialogue. In September’s Trump-Xi summit, point out of denuclearization was omitted from readouts from each Washington and Beijing.
Kim Jong Un has additionally left the door open. North Korean statements have constantly shunned criticizing Trump personally, even when complaining about US coverage. In September 2025, Kim Jong Un even mentioned he nonetheless had fond reminiscences of Trump and there was no purpose to not meet the United States if Washington dropped calls for for denuclearization—a place that has been bolstered by subsequent statements by his sister. There are nonetheless doubtless strategic causes for Kim to fulfill Trump once more. Constructing higher relations with america, South Korea’s principal ally, might strengthen Pyongyang’s strategic place in opposition to Seoul and improve Kim’s worldwide standing additional than what his relations with both China or Russia can result in.
Whereas it’s unclear whether or not the US and North Korea can discover widespread floor in time, the November APEC summit in Shenzhen gives a possible alternative to facilitate such a gathering. Ought to Trump search China’s assist, Xi might organize for a Trump-Kim or Trump-Xi-Kim assembly and show China’s diplomatic affect. Trump is unlikely to formally acknowledge North Korea as a nuclear-weapon state, however he might also chorus from making denuclearization the aim of the summit, as rhetoric from the current Xi-Trump summit appear to counsel. Whether or not that might be sufficient to entice the North Koreans again to the desk is unclear.
An Uncomfortable Interim Method: Peaceable Coexistence with Nuclear Constraints
Broadly talking, there are two approaches to the North Korean nuclear drawback: a transparent and direct one and an uncomfortable, gradual one. The previous, largely conservative strategy emphasizes most strain and sanctions, opposes incentives with out prior vital denuclearization steps, favors an enormous deal for CVID over small offers, and retains army choices on the desk. If profitable, such an strategy might resolve the nuclear drawback decisively and cleanly. In observe, nonetheless, it has proved unrealistic and doubtlessly harmful, with North Korea racing forward with its nuclear improvement because the West holds out for an ideal resolution. CVID and the formulation of “denuclearization first, peace regime later” have lacked each efficient means and a viable path to implementation.
The “uncomfortable” strategy begins by acknowledging that earlier denuclearization methods have failed and that coexistence with a nuclear-armed North Korea could also be unavoidable for an prolonged interval. It retains full denuclearization as a long-term objective however focuses first on pressing safety priorities: suspending nuclear actions comparable to fissile materials manufacturing, weaponization, and nuclear and ICBM testing; stopping army clashes; and lowering nuclear dangers. Quite than insisting rigidly on “denuclearization first,” it permits peace-building and danger discount to proceed in parallel with, or the place potential upfront of, denuclearization.
It additionally acknowledges the bounds of South Korea’s function and the main function of america in breaking the diplomatic impasse. This, nonetheless, just isn’t appeasement. Deterrence and sanctions should stay a part of the technique so long as North Korea has nuclear weapons.
The Lee Jae Myung authorities is already shifting on this course by means of its pragmatic diplomacy. It has made “peaceable coexistence” its prime precedence in its North Korea coverage and doesn’t insist on “denuclearization first.” Its END initiative—change, normalization, and denuclearization—introduced in September 2025, rejects inflexible sequencing among the many three pillars and seeks progress wherever potential. The Lee authorities has additionally proposed a three-stage strategy to denuclearization: suspension-reduction-dismantlement. Quite than repeating the more and more ineffective name for “full denuclearization,” this strategy focuses first on suspending what it might probably as a substantive interim stage that could possibly be accompanied by partial sanctions aid and different incentives.
Above all, the Lee authorities has seen one other Trump-Kim summit as a possible breakthrough for denuclearization and peaceable coexistence. On the August 2025 US-ROK summit, Lee requested Trump to function a “peacemaker” on the Korean Peninsula whereas casting himself as a “pacemaker” in assist of Trump’s efforts. This marked a departure from the Moon Jae In authorities’s idea of South Korea’s function because the “driver” of Korean Peninsula diplomacy.
These shifting South Korean and US positions would give North Korea extra room to reenter dialogue at a decrease political price. For North Korea, one other summit might open the door to sanctions aid, improved relations with Washington, enhanced worldwide standing, and diminished strain for instant and full denuclearization. Kim Jong Un might due to this fact discover it more and more unwise to disregard Trump’s overtures altogether.
For america, renewed diplomacy would assist examine North Korea’s runaway nuclear and missile packages. Particularly, a suspension of ICBM testing and improvement would cut back one of the crucial direct safety threats to the U.S. homeland. Lowered tensions and higher stability on the Korean Peninsula would additionally enable Washington to dedicate extra diplomatic, army, and strategic sources to different urgent regional and world challenges. For Trump personally, a profitable cope with Pyongyang might ship a major foreign-policy achievement and assist restore his picture as a peacemaker.
If Seoul and Washington put together a political, diplomatic, and financial bundle engaging sufficient to deliver North Korea to the negotiating desk and safe some stage of nuclear constraints, Kim’s calculus might change. The instant job is to persuade Pyongyang that dialogue is extra advantageous than confrontation. The final word job is to persuade it that denuclearization is extra advantageous than nuclear armament.
To get there, we have to construct a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula that makes peaceable coexistence between the 2 Koreas potential and permits them to maneuver past zero-sum safety competitors.
The street might be lengthy and arduous. The important problem is to journey that street with out conflict or nuclear use.
