This text is from the sixth version (July–September 2026) of 38 North’s quarterly product, North Korea Briefing, that screens key inner developments in North Korea. For the complete version, click on right here.
US President Trump and South Korea’s protection minister superior differing figures for the variety of North Korean nuclear weapons, underscoring key uncertainties in assessing the dimensions of Pyongyang’s stockpile. These embrace the quantity of fissile materials, the North’s manufacturing capability, the quantities and kinds of fissile materials utilized in its nuclear weapons, and the proportion of various weapon designs deployed. The third quarter once more featured solely launches of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and land assault cruise missiles (LACMs), persevering with a drought in strategic missile launches extending again to not less than January 2025. This implies the North could regard earlier launches as enough to take care of minimal reliability within the deployed strategic power and underscores the significance of political over technical and operational elements in selections over what missiles are launched when. Lastly, Russia reportedly is in search of North Korea’s scaled-up Hwasong- (HS-) 11C variant of the KN-23 SRBM, which would offer a heavier payload to be used in its battle with Ukraine.
Dueling Estimates Spotlight North Korea Nuclear Stockpile Uncertainties
On August 19, US President Trump acknowledged with out offering additional element that North Korea “has 57 very highly effective nuclear weapons.” The subsequent day, South Korea’s protection minister instructed parliament, “We sometimes see that [the North has] round 80 to 120” nukes, later attributing that determine to “an estimate by a personal analysis institute.” (After the top of the quarter, on October 3, President Trump mentioned with out additional clarification that Kim Jong Un had “112 nuclear missiles.”)
Context and Implications
Trump’s 57 quantity is in step with numerous Western suppose tank analyses, together with these of the Congressional Analysis Service (about 50 weapons and fissile materials for as much as 40 extra), Stockholm Worldwide Peace Analysis Institute (60 weapons and fissile materials for not less than 30 extra), and Federation of American Scientists (similar). The ROK’s (Republic of Korea; South Korea) Korean Institute for Protection Evaluation has estimated the North’s stockpile at 127-150 weapons, nearer to the protection minister’s figures and Trump’s “112 nuclear missiles.”
The variation amongst these figures underscores the uncertainty in assessing North Korean fissile materials and nuclear weapons holdings. Even Western intelligence businesses in all probability face estimative uncertainties, albeit hopefully to a lesser extent than exterior analysts. 4 key uncertainties in all probability underpinning totally different estimates are:
Quantity of weapons-grade fissile materials. Even open-source estimates of plutonium manufacturing at North Korea’s authentic 5-megawatt reactor at Yongbyon needs to be fairly good. However manufacturing on the new experimental mild water reactor (EWLR) can be tougher to estimate given uncertainties over the extent to which the reactor can be used for electrical energy era or tritium reasonably than plutonium manufacturing. Enriched uranium manufacturing is even tougher to estimate given uncertainties concerning the North’s centrifuge enrichment capability, its use for EWLR or future nuclear submarine gasoline reasonably than weapons, and the doable existence of further enrichment amenities past Yongbyon and Kangson.
Weapons manufacturing capability. The North’s capability for manufacturing nuclear weapons from fissile materials and different elements is unknown. Western estimates posit substantial quantities of fissile materials not but manufactured into weapons, suggesting manufacturing limits. However that is an assumption reasonably than data-driven. In the meantime, North Korea made continued will increase in nuclear weapons manufacturing a precedence on the Ninth Social gathering Congress in February, and a July 9 enlarged assembly of the Social gathering’s Central Navy Fee led by Kim Jong Un “determined [inter alia] on … bolstering up the nuclear power each in high quality and amount.”
Fissile materials per weapon. Open-source data doesn’t reveal the designs or quantities and mixes of fissile materials utilized in deployed North Korean nuclear warheads. Though photographs of nuclear weapons mockups might help sure estimates, it’s unclear to what extent they signify deployed designs. Analysts additionally differ on Pyongyang’s technical capabilities and subsequently the quantity of fissile materials wanted per weapon sort. That is compounded by uncertainty over the extent to which the weapons use mixes of plutonium and uranium, and whether or not the North deploys high-yield pure fission, boosted, or thermonuclear weapons.
Combine of various weapons sorts. Translating fissile materials manufacturing into nuclear weapon numbers is also sophisticated by the dearth of open-source data on the stockpile’s breakdown amongst totally different weapons sorts. A stockpile of principally small “tactical” nuclear weapons could have totally different fissile materials necessities than one made up principally of high-yield pure fission or boosted weapons. Uncertainty over what number of launchers and missiles North Korea has or will deploy, and the big variety of supply techniques related to nuclear weapons additional complicate stockpile estimates.
Launch Exercise Continues Concentrate on Theater Methods
North Korea reportedly performed six units of ballistic missile and LACM launches within the third quarter, three of which had been reported in Pyongyang’s media:
- On July 4, North Korean media reported that 5 “strategic cruise missiles” had been launched from the Kang Kon, the second new Choe Hyon-class destroyer, as a part of the ship’s pre-operational sea trials. (The Kang Kon was formally commissioned into service with the East Sea Fleet on September 6, based on North Korean)
- On August 6, ROK and Japanese protection businesses reported the launch of a single SRBM of an unknown sort “from the Wonsan space … towards the East Sea,” to an unknown vary.
- On August 12, a single SRBM was launched from the same location to a spread of about 700 km and a most altitude of 90 km, based on the ROK and Japanese militaries. The flight traits counsel the usage of a KN-23/Hwasong-11A SRBM.
- On August 20, based on ROK and Japanese army sources, about 10 SRBMs had been launched from Pyongyang to the northeast, flying about 300 km at a most altitude of 90 km. The vary and variety of missiles counsel the usage of KN-25 SRBMs, what Pyongyang phrases 600-mm “super-large” a number of launch rockets.
- On September 12, North Korean media reported a “joint firepower assault drill of long-range artillery and missile items.” Evaluation of related images means that not less than one KN-23 and 5 KN-25 SRBMs, and one Hwasal-class LACM, had been launched to reach on the similar influence space at about the identical time. The South Korean army reported that “a number of” SRBMs had flown about 250 km. A variety of tactical drones apparently had been launched on the similar goal in a separate coordinated influence.
- On September 20, the North reported having “efficiently examined a new-type weapon” that related photographs confirmed to be the HS-11E, which was revealed in October 2025 to make use of the bigger booster of the HS-11C variant of the KN-23 SRBM to hold a hypersonic glide car (HGV). Two missiles had been launched, based on the South Korean army, to ranges of 450 and over 600 km. Information from the North Korean photographs counsel the “HS-11E-1” flew to about 900 km on a maneuvering trajectory that may have partially gone beneath South Korean radar.
Context and Implications
Though Western media ascribed a political messaging function to the three units of August SRBM launches associated to US-ROK joint army workout routines and to the North’s August 19 response to US President Trump’s expressed curiosity in assembly with Kim Jong Un, that is hypothesis within the absence of any North Korea statements in regards to the launches. At a minimal, as with the September 12 drill, the August SRBM launches offered a crew coaching alternative for the taking part missile items. The September 12 drill additionally signaled continued North Korean curiosity in coordinating disparate theater strike techniques to beat alliance air and missile defenses.
The third quarter continued a drought in strategic missile launches extending again to October 2024 for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), January 2025 for intermediate vary ballistic missiles (IRBMs), December 2022 for medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and October 2019 for “true” submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), versus sub-launched KN-23 SRBMs. (The IRBM drought ended on October 3, when North Korea reported an operational troop coaching launch of a solid-fuel HS-16B IRBM carrying a hypersonic glide car (HGV), implying the system is operational.) Though the North may resume such launches at any time, the lengthy hiatus suggests Pyongyang could regard flight-testing thus far as sufficient to take care of enough reliability of deployed missiles. It additionally underscores that political elements in all probability proceed to trump technical and operational ones within the timing and circumstances of North Korean strategic missile launches.
Russia Reportedly Seeks Bigger North Korean SRBMs
Ukrainian protection intelligence reported on August 27 that Russia had requested North Korea to offer “KN-30” SRBMs. Though there isn’t a proof of any having been offered thus far, particulars of the following spherical of North Korean shipments to Russia reportedly had been to have been finalized in September.
Context and Implications
The Ukrainians are utilizing “KN-30” to seek advice from the scaled-up variant of the KN-23 first flight-tested in March 2021, designated by the North Koreans as HS-11C. The HS-11C reportedly has a rocket motor about 1 m longer than the KN-23’s (however the identical diameter), and a payload part about 0.5 m longer. The North Koreans initially claimed the HS-11C carried a 2,500 kg warhead to a spread of 600 km. In July 2024, they reported testing the “Hwasongpho-11Da-4.5,” an HS-11C with a 4,500 kg warhead, to the identical vary. The fundamental KN-23 (HS-11A) is assessed to hold a 400 kg payload as much as 800 km, making a 2,500 kg payload with the HS-11C’s bigger booster believable. A 4,500 kg payload to 600 km is a tougher promote, and South Korean assessments of that North Korean assertion as propaganda can’t be dominated out.
It’s affordable that the Russians can be considering a larger-payload SRBM to extend harm in opposition to Ukrainian city targets. The HS-11C additionally has been suspected of getting an earth-penetrator position in opposition to bunkered targets, which Moscow presumably additionally would discover helpful in Ukraine. For its half, North Korea may use HS-11C fight expertise to validate the missile’s efficiency and make enhancements. It stays to be seen whether or not the HS-11C seems in Ukraine and whether or not it’s transferred to the Russians or deployed with a North Korean missile launch unit reportedly being stationed there once more to help Russian operations.
